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Doctor of Philosophy 
 




         Title: Activism or Extractivism: Indigenous Land Struggles in Eastern Bolivia 
 
 
This dissertation is a study of the tensions between the Movement 
Toward Socialism (MAS) political party, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO), and indigenous social movement struggles for territorial autonomy. 
This study takes a multiscale approach by examining (1) the emergence of 
competing indigenous leadership organizations, (2) state repression of civil 
society groups, and (3) strategic indigenous-NGO alliances to preserve Native 
Community Lands (Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen, TCOs). At the community 
level, the study examines new organizations of state-aligned indigenous groups 
that represent extractive interests and threaten social movement cohesion. At the 
national level, this paper analyzes the controversial road project in the Isiboro-
Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) and similar state 
efforts to erode legal protections for native lands in the interests of extractivism. 
Analyzing the academic and public debates over indigenous politics in the 
Amazon, this study explores the struggle between the state and lowland 
indigenous groups over popular hegemony and the ability to shape international 
perception over indigeneity, socialism, and resource exploitation. The findings 
support lowland indigenous social movement claims of state repression but 
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situate this criticism within a path dependent world system dominated by global 
capital.   
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After decades of struggle, indigenous peoples of the Bolivian lowlands 
began to receive official communal land titles to their ancestral territories. Based 
on earlier radical social movement organizing, these land reforms began to be 
officially recognized in the 1980s and 1990s under neoliberal regimes, purported 
to advance both conservation and social justice goals, and were expanded under 
Evo Morales’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government (Postero 2007). 
The success of these Native Community Lands (Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen, 
TCOs) in addressing social and environmental needs has been mixed, with state 
and extractivist interests threatening the viability of these protected territories - 
most notably in the TIPNIS conflict (Webber 2012; McNeish 2013). This paper 
takes a case study approach to understanding the tensions between local 
autonomy and resource pressures. Interview data with indigenous leaders, NGO 
directors, and related stakeholders help to triangulated archival and peer reviewed 
literature to better understand the regional and international complexities of these 
political-economic land and resource struggles. I situate my analysis in lowland 
indigenous community responses to territorial threats in the Department of Santa 
Cruz, a frontier region of eastern Bolivia experiencing rapid deforestation and 
natural resource extraction (NASA 2016).  
By documenting the conditions within rural indigenous territories (TCOs) 
I provide greater understanding of the dynamic conditions emerging in these 
communities related to the dialectical relationships between competing 
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community visions, resource extraction, and political economic pressures within 
the world system. My analysis documents and explains internal political 
cleavages in lowland indigenous communities – conditions indicative of larger 
trends that threaten indigenous-left coalitions across Bolivia that struggled for 
generations for territory and dignity.  
This research highlights the complex tensions between indigenous lands 
vis-à-vis state and non-state actors and connects long-term human rights efforts to 
secure communally held territory, to environmental preservation – part of the 
well documented relationship between indigenous territorial autonomy and 
ecosystem preservation (Langton, Palmer, & Rhea 2014). I also explore current 
community efforts to shape development within indigenous territories – and 
historize and contextualize these movements within a rich tradition of indigenous 
and leftist coalitions (Cusicanqui 2007).  
Bolivia’s rural indigenous population are among the poorest people in a 
country that is one of the poorest in Latin America (UNICEF). However, many 
native peoples have varying degrees of communally-held property rights to vast 
territories – placing them in a land rich, cash poor position, within a raw 
materials extraction-based periphery nation. Indigenous social movement 
struggles within Bolivia are unique in Latin America given that both president 
Morales, and the lowland movements under review, deploy similar discourses of 
indigeneity, land sovereignty, ecology, socialism - and criticisms of neo-
colonialism and extractivism. Understanding the disparate histories and 
allegiances at various scales allows us to better explore the fault lines within 
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these divided native communities. These power struggles highlight critical 
questions concerning democratic processes of governance in Latin American and 
the degree to which countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela – often 
characterized as left or center left – are actually enacting policies in line with 
their rhetoric.   
Critics often argue that self-proclaimed leftist countries in Latin America 
are simply continuing historically-entrenched neocolonial policies of resource 
use, economic austerity, and international trade similar to preceding neoliberal 
regimes (Prevost, Vanden, & Campos, 2012). Eduardo Gudynas, the Uruguayan 
political ecologist, claims that Bolivia, and other center-left Latin American 
states, are engaged in a new extractivism partnering with multinational 
corporations and gaining greater royalties without addressing the underlying class 
structures of maldistribution (2009). Proponents of the MAS strategy, including 
the social theorist and current Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, 
describe the economic model as, “Andean capitalism” or “Andean-Amazonian 
capitalism,” arguing that “communism must be built based on a society’s ability 
to self-organize…but currently, it is clear that that is not our immediate future” 
and argues that Bolivia must continue extraction for the next 50 - 100 years 
(2014:12).  
To wade through these theoretical discussions, it is essential to better 
understand the living conditions and struggles of some of the most vulnerable 
communities. In Bolivia, these are the rural indigenous peoples of the eastern 
lowlands. We must first ask; to what degree has wealth been meaningfully 
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distributed to these communities? How have indigenous peoples of the Amazon 
basin, as front-line communities of extraction and economic deprivation, been 
impacted by state-sponsored policies? Are we to understand the contradictions of 
the current Morales administration as characteristic of political choice, core-
periphery relationships, or political expediency over long term integrity? These 
are challenging questions if we are to better understand the degree to which the 
radical new (2009) Constitution of Bolivia is living up to its ecological, socialist 
precepts of substantive equity among peoples and the legal “rights of mother 
nature.” 
Interviewing indigenous TCO residents concerning the degree to which 
their community are consulted, and impacted, by natural resource development 
and extraction is a powerful metric for understanding issues of environmental 
justice, and resource distribution. Although these indigenous communities may 
technically own the land, subsoil resources, including oil and gas, remain the 
property of the state. In many cases, when state redistribution does not occur, 
factions of indigenous communities may seek to deal directly with multinational 
corporations in a Faustian bargain for access to hydrocarbon rents (Anthias 
2016).  
Relations between the state and eastern indigenous communities have 
eroded in recent years by a host of governmental legislation and actions that seek 
to undermine local sovereignty. For example, the MAS mandated that TCOs must 
have a minimum of 5000 residents before claiming autonomous status, 
(Framework Law on Autonomies). Further, critics argue that, despite legislation 
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for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) the MAS did not participate in good 
faith efforts with the TIPNIS national park and TCO residents before initiating 
the massive road construction project. As a result, when nonviolent protests 
began, there was violent police repression (Delgado 2017). These conflict 
dynamics are prevalent in the hydrocarbon rich reserves of the Chaco region 
(Bebbington and Bebbington 2010), productive cattle and agricultural lands in the 
Departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando (FAO 2018), and the great tropical 
hardwood forests, particularly in the Chiquitania, where the largest tropical dry 
forest in South America still stands (UNESCO 2011).  
Within a global context, if leftist Latin American governments are to 
remain in power, resisting the international movement to the right, more 
sustainable models for development that consider the needs of labor and the 
environment must be explored. Research on territorial empowerment of 
indigenous peoples in the Global South is crucial, given the connection between 
indigenous land sovereignty and ecosystem preservation (Stevens 2014; Doak, 
Bakker, Goldstein, Hale 2015). All of the current conflicts occur within the 
context of a rich and radical labor history.  
Bolivia’s labor history in the 1920s was punctuated by powerful miner 
and industrial unions advocating for better working conditions that encompassed 
collective claims for human rights and democracy throughout the nation and 
played a central role in long term opposition to authoritarian forms of governance 
(Postero 2010). These sindicatos (unions) were instrumental in the 1952 
revolution and agrarian reforms of the following year that began the complex 
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process of land redistribution. Land reforms officially began in 1953 in the small 
town of Ucureña in the province of Cochabamba. The decree was signed by 
national revolutionary leader, Víctor Paz Estenssoro (Fontana 2014).  
Social movement resistance to colonial racism grew after the 1952 
revolution and gained momentum during the first wave of neoliberalism 
beginning in 1985 when the World Bank and IMF supported economic policies, 
specifically the New Economic Policy (NEP) and Structural Adjustment Policy 
(SAP) that propelled the country into widespread social and ecological problems 
(Kohl 2002). This social crisis led to a second wave of “hybrid” neoliberalism 
punctuated by calls for rights and citizenship based on an identity that Nancy 
Postero terms postmulticultural citizenship (2007:2). The state granted certain 
minimum packages of cultural, environmental, and social rights, with key 
legislation including the 1993 Law of Popular Participation (Postero 2007). There 
has been more focus on the Morales government as representative of a post-
neoliberal leftist project than the ways that the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 
has continued the multiculturalism of the prior neoliberal period of the 1990s 
(Prashad and Ballve 2006). 
The official recognition of Original Communal Lands (TCOs) passed into 
law in 1996 under the National Agrarian Reform Law (INRA), with the first – 
TCO Itika Guasu, a series of Guarani communities in the Chaco – recognized a 
year later in 1997 (Anthias 2016). TCOs were part of a larger effort among the 
World Bank and other international development institutions who began working 
with governments of the Global South to support efforts for indigenous-owned 
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land titles. In Bolivia, this top-down effort was part of the inception of the 
process of forming TCOs although indigenous communal lands were not simply 
a top-down ‘ethno-environmental fix’ (Anthias & Radcliffe 2013). These 
progressive changes occurred simultaneously with the creation of conservation 
and indigenous territories (TCOs) in Bolivia and in other Latin American 
countries (Zimmerer 2009). 
The neoliberal epoch was also a time of great social movement coalitions, 
when leftist highland miners, who had been forced to relocate to the lowlands 
after the tin market crash of 1985, organized with peasant unions and eastern 
indigenous groups against austerity, privatization and a host of neoliberal 
policies. This successful coalitional organizing against imperialism, and for 
indigenous and worker rights, fostered what Jeffery Webber terms the 
revolutionary epoch from 2000 – 2005 where “mass mobilizations from below 
and state crisis from above opened up opportunities for fundamental, 
transformative structural change” (2011:2). These broad, yet unstable coalitions 
of indigenous and leftist social movements once organized against neoliberalism 
and made great advances during the 2000 Cochabamba Water War and the 2003 
Gas War that left 70 protesters dead (Perreault 2012). However, these movements 
lost momentum after the election of Morales, particularly in the Media Luna (half 
moon) the four eastern lowland provinces of Tarija, Pando, Beni, and Santa Cruz, 
where relations between the state and lowland indigenous groups have become 
increasingly tense. 
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The MAS has thus far succeeded in maintaining a hegemonic framing of 
the nation that seeks to overcome internal contradictions under what Nancy 
Postero terms indigenous nationalism (2010:1). This hegemony has extended to 
extractive industries, particularly mining cooperatives working in tandem with 
the state to form resource regimes (Marston & Perreault 2017:1). Importantly, 
increasing discontent and opposition threaten the long-term legitimacy of the 
state, particularly in the east. Even early in the Morales Administration, in 2008, 
the autonomy movements of the eastern lowlands brought the country to a state 
of crisis over access and control of hydrocarbon rents (Bebbington and 
Bebbington 2010). As the international press hailed the election of Evo, the first 
indigenous president of Bolivia and the Americas, there was a great hope for 
improving human rights conditions, environmental stewardship and building 
democratic institutions across Latin America (Cusicanqui 2011). In subsequent 
years, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Nicaragua’s Daniel 
Ortega, Cuba’s Castro, and a host of leftist presidents formed economic and 
social agreements to oppose the Monroe Doctrine of U.S. interventionism in the 
region and reshape neo-colonial relationships to extraction.  importantly, the 
success of unions, and their central role in resistance to state oppression, unions 
became the main legitimate form of gaining political rights and remain salient to 
Bolivian political life (Garcia, Leon, & Monje 2004). This is demonstrated by the 
career of Evo Morales who build his pro-labor, anti-imperialist reputation as the 
leader of the cocalero (coca growers) union before assuming the presidency 
(Farthing & Kohl 2010). Even today, Evo remains the head of the cocalero union, 
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a significant reminder of his remaining allegiances. Increasingly, the perceived 
dissonance between the government’s rhetoric and actions have led lowland 
indigenous critics to describe the MAS as practicing a double discourse – 
deploying eco-socialist rhetoric with de facto extractivist policies. Several 
interviewees made statements referencing the famous line in Orwell’s Animal 
Farm, that in Bolivia, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal 
than others.” 
Extractivism has accelerated over recent decades in Ecuador, Peru, and 
Bolivia, with much of this extraction impacting indigenous lands and waterways 
(Bebbington and Bebbington 2010). These communities face great humanitarian 
threats from extraction in, or upstream/upwind of their territories. To understand 
how social and environmental extraction impacts, more qualitative research must 
be conducted at the ground level. There is clear need for greater in-depth 
knowledge gained from interviewing a representative cross section of people 
living in TCOs to better grasp how communities are functioning and the degree to 
which consultation is occurring prior to mining, logging, or oil exploration in 
these territories. How are resources distributed? What internal political tension or 
types of corruption exist? Are national and international legal protections for 
indigenous peoples being upheld? Although the Bolivian constitution as well as 
articles 6 and 7 of I.L.O. Convention 169 of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states there should be consultation prior to 
decisions impacting communities, ambiguity exists regarding what this process of 
consultation should look like (Anaya 2005). If adequate compensation programs 
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are to be instituted for TCO communities, it is imperative to document the 
impacts of extraction, and outline deficits while working with representative local 
leadership. 
The most recent high-profile example of conflicts surrounding Bolivian 
neo-extractivism lies in the controversial proposed Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de 
Moxos highway project that threatens to cut through the heart of the Isiboro-
Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). The road project would 
allow large scale land degradation, coca production, hydrocarbons extraction, and 
result in an estimated 64% of the park being destroyed by 2030 (PIEB 2011). If 
constructed, the highway threatens to not only delegitimize indigenous territorial 
claims, but also to erode the status of protected areas like national parks, setting a 
new precedent for the face of development in Bolivia vis-à-vis indigenous 
peoples and the environment (Achtenberg 2011). 
In 2012, several months after the road project was halted amidst a national 
outcry opposing police brutality against protesters, the government passed a 
consultation law and surveyed TIPNIS communities – reporting that a majority 
(80%) were in favor of the road. However, independent observers, including 
human rights groups and the Catholic Church, conducted their own survey 
finding that the state bribed communities with items including outboard motors 
and failed to provide accurate information to residents about possible road 
impacts (Achtenberg 2012; APDHB 2012). When I visited the TIPNIS, I 
confirmed that the MAS demonstrated preferential treatment to communities in 
  11 
support of the project and overlooked aid for communities critical of the road. 
However, the TIPNIS conflict is only the tip of the iceberg (Delgado 2017). 
Lowland indigenous peoples continue to struggle for agency within an 
increasingly hostile national context. The government’s attack on aid 
organizations is primarily focused on international NGOs, as outside groups are 
easier to target than their domestic counterparts. This trend is exemplified by the 
Morales administration’s expulsion of USAID from Bolivia in 2013. The broad 
implications of the government’s authoritarian approach to development that 
challenges state policies have left many indigenous communities in difficult 
economic, social, and political situations. I argue that the MAS has launched a 
strategic effort to intentionally undermine indigenous groups critical of state 
development goals by targeting their institutional capacity builders – NGOs. For 
example, the MAS government is having a chilling effect on autonomous civil 
society organizations that participate in indigenous and rural capacity building – 
particularly in the lowlands. With a recent crackdown on four well-respected 
organizations including Fundacion Milenio, Fundacion Tierra, CEDLA (the 
Study of Labor and Agrarian Development), and CEDIB (Bolivian Center for 
Documentation and Información), who was recently asked to leave their building 
with only a two-day notice (Achtenberg 2015). According to CEDIB Director, 
Marco Gandarillas, the move was political. Gandarillas goes on to say, “the 
government, is trying to hurt us” (Hill 2017). Additionally, the MAS may create 
bureaucratic hurdles for organizations, asking for many years of past records that 
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effectively divert scarce resources away from an NGO’s mission to meet 
government demands. 
Building on a resource mobilization approach outlined by Charles Tilly, 
Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Mayer Zald and a host of social movement 
theorists, I contend that the state, recognizing lowland indigenous social 
movements depend on both societal and external support for success, is attacking 
networks of foreign and domestic NGOs that provide these groups crucial 
resources for organizing. There is clear need to better understand and document 
the ways in which processes of state repression take place against civil society in 
efforts to ensure the rights of vulnerable and marginalized peoples are protected. 
More research must be conducted on this state crackdown on NGOs and how the 
loss of resources effects indigenous lowland communities. 
In addition to state repression, other factors also influence the loss of 
indigenous resource mobilization and institutional capacities. Interviews with 
development workers identify a general political movement to the right across 
Europe and the subsequent turn towards isolationism and a reduced focus on 
humanitarian projects – particularly within Scandinavian nations with long 
histories of support for indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Additionally, the 
development of parallel organizations that undermining the ability for 
communities to organize, work with aid groups, and form effective coalitions 
capable of mounting shared grievances against the state.  
The phenomenon of parallel organizations, often termed paralelismo, has 
become increasingly common in the political terrain of TCOs, and within the 
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Bolivian body politic. The roots of the breakdown can be traced to profound 
changes within the Pact of Unity (Pacto de Unidad), the most important left-
indigenous alliance in the Constitutional Assembly. Amidst the national debate 
over the controversial TIPNIS road project, the Unity Pact balkanized and 
realigned in 2011 after CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), 
the most important coalition of lowland indigenous groups and its highland 
counterpart CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu), 
formally left the Pact. After CIDOB’s departure, the MAS focused on 
undermining lowland indigenous groups and encouraged government loyalists to 
form splinter factions aligned with the state (Webber 2015, Delgado 2017). One 
notable example of the government’s crackdown is demonstrated by the state 
accusation that CIDOB was functioning as “dividers” (fraccionalistas) and 
colluding with Santa Cruz elite and leftist NGOs (Webber 2015). 
The Bolivian anthropologist and social researcher Walter Arteaga argues 
that paralelismo occurs for a variety of reasons. Principally, the dependency 
relationship between the MAS and people at the community-level is based on the 
state meeting certain basic needs. When the government fails to provide these 
services, the tacit acceptance of legitimacy begins to erode forming divisions. At 
present, these political dynamics are occurring throughout the lowlands with rival 
political parties often becoming entrenched in power struggles, weakening 
community solidarity, and making requests to the state easily dismissed or bought 
off. Another condition under which paralelismo arises is when an organization 
deviates from the state platform. The government then creates a parallel group 
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that claims loyalty and subservience to the state. The overall situation damages 
the connection between leaders and their constituents and weakens overall efforts 
for improving community conditions by the ensuing power struggle between 
groups. The MAS party seeks loyalty and attempts to silence critics through 
various forms of punishment, harassment, or threats, with dissenting women 
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CHAPTER II  
 
ACTIVISM OR EXTRACTIVISM: INDIGENOUS LAND 
STRUGGLES IN EASTERN BOLIVIA  
 
Hopes were high when Evo Morales assumed office in January 2006 
becoming the first indigenous president in the 500 years since European 
colonization of the Americas (Sivak 2010). This was a time of great hope for 
many lowland indigenous peoples in Bolivia - whose social movements struggled 
and suffered for Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) political party 
that many believed would grant full recognition of indigenous Bolivians as equals 
in the pluri-ethnic character of the nation. As Nancy Postero notes, the MAS 
party integrated opposition to neoliberalism with indigenous activism in dynamic 
ways that catalyzed the majority indigenous population of the country (2010). 
Yet even as the plurinational character of the state was becoming realized - a 
collective sense of institutional betrayal was building among many indigenous 
peoples of the east and their nongovernmental organizations (NGO) allies who 
played crucial roles in supporting Evo. Collective grievances centered around the 
MAS’ continuation of extractive policies indicative of earlier neoliberal epochs. 
The historical traditions of Bolivian social movements run deep. 
Indigenous-left coalitions of anarcho-syndicalists and Trotskyists, were born over 
a century ago in the tin mines and based in labor union struggles for equity and 
self-determination (Cusicanqui 2007). Although many of the traditional labor 
organizations changed with the closing of the tin mines in the mid 1980s that 
once constituted, “one of the most militant working classes in Latin America” 
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(Gill 2000:69). New organizing continues to occur in these dispossessed migrant 
communities, many of whom now live in the young slum city of El Alto - where 
three of the four major supply routes to the capital La Paz pass through (Harvey 
2013).  I discussed the history of Native Community Lands (Tierra Comunitaria 
de Orígen, TCOs) where, after decades of struggle, indigenous peoples of the 
Bolivian lowlands began to receive official communal land titles to their ancestral 
territories. Based on earlier radical indigenous social movement organizing and 
with the support of NGOs, these land reforms began to be officially recognized in 
the 1980s and 1990s under neoliberal regimes, purported to advance both 
conservation and social justice goals, and were expanded under Evo Morales’s 
government (Postero 2007). The success of TCOs in addressing social and 
environmental needs has been mixed, with state and extractivist interests 
currently threatening the viability of these protected territories across the eastern 
lowlands, most notably in the ongoing TIPNIS highway conflict.1  
This chapter takes a case study approach to identifying the regional 
complexities of larger political-economic patterns of land and resource struggles 
within indigenous territories and explores contemporary NGO-indigenous efforts 
to protect TCOs from multi-actor extractivist interests. I confine my analysis to 
the eastern lowlands of the Media Luna - composed of the four departments of 
Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando - and focus on TCO Guarayo in the 
                                               
1 The TIPNIS conflict centers around the government proposed Villa Tunari-San Ignacio 
de Moxos Highway project that would transect one of Bolivia’s oldest national parks and 
indigenous TCO territories allowing hydrocarbons extraction, deforestation, and other 
impacts in the region. Lowland indigenous protests against the highway have met with 
police brutality, and other forms of covert state repression.  
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Department of Santa Cruz, a frontier region experiencing rapid deforestation and 
natural resource extraction. I document two emerging social phenomena I argue 
are essential to understanding the larger political economic conditions within 
TCOs and the nexus between competing community visions, resource use models 
and power struggles. I ask; why are indigenous social movements in the Bolivian 
lowlands continuing to struggle to realize their original visions for territorial 
autonomy and dignity under Morales? Within the new constitutions, citizenship 
rights were extended to all Bolivians. Yet 12 years later, the process of land 
titling has stalled. And despite significant social movement organizing, the 
government remains able to grant hydrocarbons, logging, and mining within 
TCOs. How have social and ecological conditions within lowland indigenous 
communities changed under the MAS government?  
To answer these questions, I integrate in-depth interviews with many 
central figures in lowland indigenous social movements and NGO communities 
and contextualize this data with a theory driven case study approach to 
understanding power relations within indigenous territories. I analyze in 
particular two understudied variables central to the present crisis in native 
territories of the eastern lowlands. These variables are (1) emergent internal 
political cleavages, (parallel organizations) in indigenous leadership and (2) the 
MAS government’s repression of NGO-indigenous coalitions through overt 
threats and covert tactics. I confine my analysis to focus on parallel leadership 
organizations and the government’s strategic attack on NGOs as related social 
phenomena and describe both through my case study in the TCO Guarayo. All of 
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this is indicative of larger patterns across Latin America's Pink Tide countries and 
exemplifies the erosion of government and civil society.  
Leftist governments in the region are rapidly shifting towards politically 
expedient extractivist regimes that degrade both democratic processes and long 
term ecological imperatives while centralizing state authority and silencing 
political opposition. Research is needed to document social and environmental 
impacts from states that despite progressive rhetoric, facilitate resource 
extractivism and challenge indigenous community land sovereignty in ways 
indicative of earlier neoliberal epochs. The recent emergence of bifurcated 
indigenous leadership via parallel indigenous organizations, termed paralelismo, 
is a central problem on both the community and national levels. Within the last 
10 years, this emergency of a rival political group claiming legitimacy and 
authority threatens to undermine any possibility for indigenous governance to 
form strong coalitions to fight extractive threats. Moreover, this political 
infighting weakens democratic institutions, aid networks, community resilience, 
as well denied opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. As a result, indigenous 
territories are in a state of political, as well as economic crisis from these internal 
political divisions.  
These divisions within indigenous leadership, in conjunction with the 
state crackdown on NGOs, are intricately tied to one another. Based on 
interviews, the new parallel groups are connected to the MAS government. In the 
long term, if lowland indigenous social movements in Bolivia remain 
compromised by external and internal threats, there will likely be negative human 
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rights and environmental outcomes given the well documented relationship 
between indigenous territorial autonomy and ecosystem preservation (Langton, 
Palmer, & Rhea 2014, Stevens 2014). In the Guarayo TCO case study, I analyze 
the ways that local democratically-elected indigenous leadership groups contend 
with regional elites, colonists, parallel indigenous organizations, and an 
increasingly hostile government to maintain NGO-coalitions for land sovereignty.  
 
1. Coalitions and the Crisis of Indigenous Territorial Autonomy 
Indigenous leaders and directors of allied NGOs packed an aging hotel 
meeting room a week after May Day celebrations had died down in the plazas of 
Santa Cruz de La Sierra, the capital city of Bolivia’s eastern Media Luna 
provinces. Indigenous leaders from the Monte Verde TCO in the Chiquitano dry 
forest, the seasonally flooded Guarayo territory immediately to the west, Guaraní 
from the southern cattle and oil country and the Moxeño Trinitario of San 
Lorenzo in the TIPNIS - where at the time of writing, the controversial highway 
project moves forward despite protests. The subject of the meeting: how to 
protect indigenous territories against accelerating extractivism and challenges to 
de facto TCO sovereignty. The meeting brought together many of the main actors 
who remain part of decades-old indigenous-NGO coalitions who fought to create 
and maintain indigenous territories. One of the meeting organizers, a member of 
Fundacion Tierra, began the meeting by asking, “what is happening in the 
lowland TCOs? What is the future of the TCOs?” Participants from across the 
east described local situations with similar dynamics: unsustainable resource 
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exploitation often against the will and without compensation to TCO inhabitants 
facilitated by state approval of rules contradictory to indigenous peoples and 
supportive of outside interests using the territories as sites of extraction.  
Questions about the tenuous future of TCOs have become central in the 
age of Morales as forms of extraction that once plagued indigenous territories 
have only grown worse since the MAS came to power. The presenter went on to 
clarify that if we argue that TCOs are failing, we must also compare them to 
other non-indigenous rural communities and determine the similarities and 
differences between the two. In fact, many places outside TCOs face similar 
obstacles to TCO lands. A peer reviewed study assessing 40-year land cover 
change in the Chiquitania compared private lands versus indigenous community 
lands (both indigenous forest reserves (TCOs) and forest concessions) and 
indicated that, “private landholders converted more than 125,500 hectares 
compared to only 4,800 hectares by indigenous communities” (Killeen, et. al. 
1:2007). Resource pressures in indigenous territories are often similar to other 
lands, with the difference that TCOs, although lacking adequate governance, are 
generally better protected.  
Indigenous-NGO coalitions once successfully fought landed elites to 
destabilize past regimes that allowed Morales to slip into power while gaining 
millions of hectares of autonomous territories for native peoples. Yet these 
indigenous social movements - linked to domestic and international civil society 
organizations - now struggle to exist in the current hostile political landscape. 
Famous NGO directors from some of the country’s most well-respected 
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organizations sat alongside indigenous leaders who once occupied positions of 
authority in the government and signed into law millions of hectares of 
indigenous TCO territories. Yet times have changed and these leaders now 
attended the meeting to collaborate on protecting their life’s work: supporting 
indigenous people’s human rights through territorial sovereignty, a politically 
salient - practically difficult task.  
Development worker’s careers have been dedicated to carefully building 
land and cultural rights for indigenous Bolivians. Although this work is rapidly 
eroding under the Morales administration and Vice President Alvaro Garcia 
Linera whose public statements often publicly accuse NGOs of promoting 
“transnational imperial policy” (Achtenberg 2015). The state’s chilling effect 
looms in the minds of many development workers as a constant threat, 
particularly with the expulsion of Danish NGO Ibis in 2013, and Linera’s public 
statements against four prominent Bolivian NGOs for “meddling in political 
affairs.” According to Unitas Director Susana Erostegui, the message from the 
MAS is, “don’t get involved in politics and definitely don’t criticize the politics 
of the government”(Sterling 2015). Moira Birss, writing in a 2017 NACLA report 
comments that state intimidation of civil society groups that stand in the way of 
development have become common throughout Latin America and describes how 
states are often reluctant to employ violence because of the possibility of public 
outcry. Instead, the strategy is to criminalize activists in an effort to, “hinder their 
work because of the time, energy, and financial resources they must dedicate to 
legal defense” (Birss 2017). As well as attacking NGOs funding sources of 
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indigenous social movements, the state plays a supporting role in parallel group 
formation discussed later.  
About two months after the historic NGO-indigenous meeting, the MAS 
government once again began construction on the country’s most controversial 
highway project - a road through the TIPNIS, a piece of land the size of Jamaica 
whose doubly protected status as both National Park since 1965 and indigenous 
TCO since 1990, left many within the national and international community 
shocked (Costas Monje and Ortiz 2010). Six years earlier, in 2011, the 
government ended attempts to complete the highway after widespread protests 
and violent confrontations between police and thousands of protesters across 
Bolivia demanded that laws protecting the TIPNIS be honored. If completed, the 
proposed 190-mile-long Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos highway would 
transect the heart of the National Park and TCO and effectively cut the area in 
two. Access would then open the site to oil exploration, mining, logging, and 
coca production among other environmental and social impacts. According to the 
Bolivian Institute for Strategic Research, the road would leave 64% of the park 
deforested within 15 years (Collyns 2017). Politically, the issue continues to 
divide the country and remains a national litmus test between indigenous 
territorial sovereignty or state sponsored extractivism. 
I argue that these two events, (1) the historic meeting of indigenous 
leadership of the eastern lowlands and their NGO allies in Santa Cruz and (2) the 
government’s decision to commence the TIPNIS road project, share a common 
theme: The recognition among both the government and civil society 
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organizations that indigenous territories are in a state of crisis. The TIPNIS is 
representative of the MAS party’s de facto policy of discounting domestic and 
international laws governing environment and indigenous people’s rights - while 
prioritizing an agenda that resembles a capitalist development model. Although I 
focus on Bolivia, the political-economic patterns of extractivism are indicative of 
larger trends in center left Latin American countries. For example, with 
analogous cases of the Ecuadorian government’s decision to drill for 
hydrocarbons in the protected Yasuni National Park and indigenous territory in 
October 2016 amidst protests closely resembling the TIPNIS model of state 
extractivism under the banner of developmentalism (Vidal 2016).  
 
1.1 Theoretical Foundations 
Political scientist Jeffrey Webber characterizes the arc of Evo’s 
presidency as moving from a revolutionary rebellious period to an epoch of 
reformism, continuing the momentum of earlier neoliberal policies (2011). 
Webber’s recent theoretical work draws on scholarship by Adam Morton to 
frame the MAS government’s approach to development in terms of Antonio 
Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution where capitalist social relations, “are 
either instituted and/or expanded, resulting in both ‘revolutionary’ rupture and a 
‘restitution’ of social relations” (2017:267). Gramsci’s passive revolution is 
broken down into three phases where (1) figures from the opposition are 
individually integrated into the state’s “political class” characterized by 
opposition to popular participation in the workings of the government, (2) where 
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larger groups of non-state actors become absorbed by the conservative party in 
power, followed by (3) large scale support from intellectuals (Webber 2017).  
I argue that while Webber’s framing of Gramsci’s second passive 
revolutionary phase is characteristic of the growth of parallel indigenous 
organizations aligning with modernist state interests, the third phase of the 
passive revolution - that of state capture of the intellectual classes is unlikely to 
occur with mounting opposition from a broad leftist intellectual base I outline 
later in this work. I build on Webber’s passive revolution analysis but argue that 
his Gramscian model of the MAS party could be further strengthened by 
including DiMaggio and Powell’s notion of institutional isomorphism to explain 
the transformation of the MAS party from an eco-socialist movement into what 
Vice President Linera now terms as “Andean-Amazonian capitalism” (Polet 
2013:4). 
In their now classic 1983 article: The Iron Cage Revisited. DiMaggio and 
Powell outline a classical Weberian dilemma readily applicable to the newly-
elected MAS party that gained power in 2006 - only to experience significant 
external and internal pressures to mimic existing structures of governance. The 
authors break down institutional isomorphism into three categories with (1) 
coercive isomorphism, being the inclusion of pressures from other entities the 
MAS depends upon, including organizations who abide by established 
bureaucratic or cultural processes. (2) Mimetic processes: unknown factors that 
encourage conservative mimicry of prior models and (3) normative pressures: the 
likely inclusion of outside bureaucrats from other sectors that carry normative 
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processes of efficiency, reification of systems of education, and hegemonic 
processes of socialization inherent in the structural conditions of bureaucracy - 
encouraging homogenous approaches to problem solving (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). While this transformation takes place over time, the authors suggest that: 
Organizations may change their goals or develop new practices, and new 
organizations enter the field. But in the long run, organizational actors, 
making rational decisions construct around themselves an environment 
that constrains their ability to change further in later years (1983:148).  
 
 This explanation suggests that the MAS government’s first term in office 
was closer to the party’s original social movement goals, with subsequent years 
serving only to cinch the knots around the organization tighter - and reduce 
emancipatory movement possibilities in the longue durée. The extractivist 
resource nationalism of the MAS, albeit theoretically distributive and successful 
in some respects, remains based on a Faustian bargain with transnational and 
domestic energy corporations functioning within the banal scope of global 
capitalism. The government’s administration of modest redistributive 
infrastructure projects throughout the country requires revenue generated by these 
partially nationalized industries to fuel the bureaucratic apparatus. Since state 
functions are dependent upon extractivism, a deepening political-economic 
contradiction forms between counter-neoliberal rhetoric and the continuation of 
neoliberal practices on the ground. Nowhere is this contradiction more stark than 
indigenous territories where state priorities require these legally protected spaces 
become extractive national sacrifice zones.  
Although the government’s original goal was to shift the economy away 
from a mainly export based peripheral relationship to one of communitarian 
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production, at present, “the economy is more dependent on primary exports than 
before” (Andreucci and Radhuber, 2017:1). A 2014 Economist article applauded 
Evo’s ability to maintain, “high prices and strong demand for Bolivia’s exports of 
gas, minerals and soybeans … and help the economy to maintain an average 
growth rate of 5%” since 2016 (The Economist 10/11/2014). Importantly, 
although government investment in public infrastructure including roads has 
increased, “social spending (has increased) only modestly in absolute terms, and 
actually declined as an absolute percentage of GDP under Morales” (Webber 
2015:326). A prominent Bolivian economist and public intellectual recently 
criticized the MAS’ economic strategy saying, “this is the apex of consumerism. 
Call this model however you want. But please, do not call it socialism, or anti-
capitalism, have some respect for Marx, please!” (Schipani 2014). A collectively 
written letter to the government from former public officials, activists and 
intellectuals claims that:  
Today, the large majority of our people basically find themselves in the 
same situation of poverty, precariousness, and anguish in which they have 
always been. It would seem that those who have improved are those that 
had always been well: the bankers, transnational oil and mining 
companies, the smugglers, and the narco traffickers” (Colectivo Manifiesto 
2011:3).  
 
This sentiment was resoundingly communicated by a number of 
indigenous leaders who considered the government’s resource policies a central 
threat to community integrity. In the words of one delegate, “extractivism is not 
the agenda of the people, it’s the agenda of the government.” Many established 
locally elected indigenous leaders claim rival parallel organizations collaborate 
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with the MAS to undermine TCO autonomy. While these allegations are 
uniformly denied by the parallel groups, there are documented examples of 
former MAS party leaders transitioning into roles in parallel leadership 
organizations and undermining local organizational structures (Los Tiempos 
7/13/2013). On the community level, the crisis of leadership generates political 
entropy, damaging local relationships and reducing local cohesion for shared 
community needs. A local indigenous leader described the conditions in a small 
Guarani community of 290 people about two hours outside the city of Santa 
Cruz, explaining that:  
The water has gone too deep for our wells - it has been this way for 8 
years. We get drinking water delivered by train from Santa Cruz once a 
month. Everyone in the village has Chagas (disease). We need a 
veterinarian because our animals have plagues. The children don’t speak 
Guarani, only the older people. Almost no one has a job here. The young 
people are all in the city and they send money back home and come back 
once a year if they can.” (Author’s interview 5/11/17).  
 
While many of these complex challenges were present prior to parallel 
group formation, the internal crisis of indigenous leadership has exacerbated 
conditions as the split represents a struggle within communities. Those who 
pursue more modernist, pro-MAS developmental goals generally side with new 
parallel leadership organizations while those supportive of more traditional 
practices and maintain ongoing relationships with NGOs, remain with traditional 
democratically elected leadership. In the following case study of the Guarayo 
people, I document the ways in which parallel leadership and state repression 
make have social and environmental co-effects. TCO Guarayo represents 
regional trends. Logging, mining, and other forms of resource use in TCOs 
  28 
threaten community and ecosystem integrity in well documented ways. However, 
the emerging leadership crisis of parallel groups is a new and striking disruption 
that threatens long term indigenous community integrity by creating a rift in 
familial allegiances and informal bonds - once to crucial for the process of 
forming shared goals and grievances that made TCOs possible. These disruptions 
impact relations with NGOs, business opportunities and stifle the many 
possibilities that come with tacit community cohesion. Compounded with the 
Gurayo people’s vulnerable population, and language - the rift represents a crisis 
for the group’s long term cultural survival. I examine these complex challenges in 
the context of the group’s unique history, famous musical traditions, and 
significant opportunities for independent development.  
 
1.2 TCO Guarayo Case Study   
The Guarayo people are of Guarani origin. Their oral tradition tells of a 
great migration from present day Paraguay before the colonization of the 
Americans between the 11th - 15th century in search of better lands for 
agriculture (FAO 2011). There are an estimated 15,000 ethnic Guarayos living in 
16 communities, half of which have a majority Guarayo presence. The Guarayo 
TCO originally consisted of 2,205,537 hectares and is composed mostly of low 
rolling hills, mountains, and alluvial plains transected by the Negro, Blanco, San 
Julián, San Pablo, and Zapocó rivers that flow from the south to the north. The 
summer rainy season is November - April and winter dry season extends from 
May – October (UN Food and Agriculture Organization). Much of the territory is 
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low lying seasonally flooded lands that restrict logging during the summer 
months and require travel by boat to access the more remote communities. Unlike 
in the Chiquitania where Jesuit missionaries were the main source of colonial 
dominance, the Guarayo were exposed to Franciscan monks whose rich musical 
traditions remain to the present with an internationally renowned Baroque music 
festival occurring each year in the town of Urubicha and strong musical legacies 
remaining throughout other Guarayo communities.  
Parallel organizations became increasingly common in TCO Guarayo, and 
other indigenous territories, and throughout the Bolivian body politic over the last 
decade. The term parallel organization or parallelismo, within the Latin 
American context, is meant to refer only to parallel organizations that occupy 
redundant or conflicting roles at the local level. In recent years, conflicts between 
parallel leadership organizations in TCO Guarayo have exacerbated social, 
political, and resource tensions and threaten to unravel the already fragile 
indigenous governance structures of the territory. As one development worker 
explained, “when you mention COPNAG (the main Guarayo indigenous 
leadership body) “you have to clarify which COPNAG you are talking about.” 
According to researchers Anne Larson, Peter Cronkleton and Juan Pulhin, 
COPNAG (Central de Organizaciones de los Pueblos Nativos Guarayos) formed 
in the 1990s as a regional indigenous leadership organization within TCO 
Guarayo to advocate for all the local Guarayos and assist in the TCO land titling 
process via pressuring the state to acknowledge claims for greater territory and 
function as an intermediary between the indigenous communities and the 
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government. Although the organization originally asked for 2.2 million hectares 
of TCO lands, the amount was later reduced to 1.3 million hectares after a state-
sponsored needs assessment. Still, this remains a large territory for a young 
organization to administer with little resources and long distances between small 
villages.   
There are regionally unique reasons for why parallel leadership groups are 
forming across the country - with little academic literature on the phenomenon as 
a whole and particularly within the Latin American context. The political 
leadership bifurcation in TCO Guarayo occurred approximately ten years ago in 
2007 between organic and parallel organizations. Theorists including Rousseau 
and Hudon argue that parallelism can benefit marginalized groups via the 
formation of parallel groups within Bolivian indigenous women’s movements 
that became instrumental in granting women entree into national politics (2017). 
Patrice McSherry discusses parallelism within the context of military and covert 
operations within Latin America and argues that at the state level parallel groups 
are, “an instrument to accomplish secretly what could not be accomplished 
legally or politically” (2005:21).  
McSherry notes that although parallel organizations such as paramilitary 
death squads are a useful means for authoritarian governments to consolidate 
power through the use of terror - these groups pose a risk to the state because of 
their high level of independence, “by involving themselves in crime, drug 
trafficking, and other illicit operations to become self-financing, parallel groups 
can avoid accountability to their original masters” (2005:22). Indeed, within TCO 
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Guarayo, there are documented cases of the parallel organization participating in 
illegal land sales to colonists and other activities (El Deber 9/4/2017). Established 
Guarayo leaders expressed concern over the parallel group’s illegal land sales, 
mining concessions to Chinese firms, and alleged involvement in drug trafficking 
- placing communities at risk of increased violence and environmental 
contamination. The parallel organizations also compete for increasingly scarce 
resources from NGOs threatened by state crackdowns. Why did rival leadership 
factions form? How has this crisis of local leadership impacted indigenous 
territoriality? One Guarayo leader describes the politics in his community: 
People that were once loyal to the original causes are now divided because 
of corruption, drugs, and illegal land sales. The development organizations 
that fund projects in the TCOs create competition over resources. People 
start thinking individualistically about themselves. The NGOs are trying to 
help but it creates conflicts in the TCO communities. Even some of the 
older generation of leaders have become individualistic, selling out 
resources for personal gain. The majority of leaders are shifting from rural 
to urban living and there is a growing disconnect between the land and 
people because the leaders have to work with the government. Also, many 
leaders have to take second jobs to earn a living in addition to doing their 
political jobs. 
  
This description outlines a common occurrence where indigenous leaders 
go unpaid for service to their community. Many are teachers, farmers or laborers 
who perform their leadership role as a community service position - often at great 
sacrifice to their own lives and those of their families. Ideological and economic 
pressures contribute to parallelism. Many leaders rely on NGOs to fund their 
viáticos, basic expenses associated with travel, including daily stipends for the 
cost of participation in indigenous meetings. These payments are essential for 
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leaders to organize because they often cannot afford even the bus ride to a 
meeting (Postero 177:2007).  
Municipal governments receive money from state coffers for 
administration, however according to COPNAG leadership, no part of these 
federal funds is redistributed to their group. Importantly, before the creation of 
COPNAG, resource use was handled on the community level. Leaders are elected 
through general assembly of all indigenous communities in the province - 
although the TCO spans three municipalities where only one has an indigenous 
majority. The state’s laws, under the usos y costumbres (traditional uses and 
practices) statute gives ambiguous authority for TCOs to manage resource use. 
COPNAG was originally conceived to act on behalf of the Guarayos peoples and 
to administer forest management plans within the Guarayos TCO. However, land 
competition has increased particularly in the 1970s as outside interests, mainly 
cattle, timber, colonists, and agricultural sectors, began moving in for land and 
forest resources.  
A splinter COPNAG formed when allegations of corruption surfaced over 
land deals. In the year 2001, there were 44 fraudulent land sales where both 
INRA and COPNAG members were implicated (Lopez 2004). The crisis of 
legitimacy incited calls for a new election and in 2007 a female president was 
elected. The leaders who originally participated in the scandal - via false land 
titles within the TCO - left their positions and formed the parallel COPNAG. 
These leaders are acknowledged as the legitimate leadership organization by the 
right-wing Department of Santa Cruz government, the civic committee (Comite 
  33 
Civico) that represents regional elite agriculture, cattle, and oil interests. These 
groups once waged major efforts to secede from Bolivia under Morales but have 
more recently pushed for greater departmental rights from the central government 
using a rhetoric of autonomy rather than succession - sometimes aligning their 
shared grievances with discontent indigenous peoples. These organizations 
continue legitimating the parallel COPNAG who serve their regional interests 
vis-a-vis the state and furthering access to land and resources via encouraging 
discord within a divided TCO Guarayo (Larson, Cronkleton, and Pulhin 2015).   
The roots of the balkanization within indigenous leadership can be traced 
to profound changes within the Pact of Unity (Pacto de Unidad) - the most 
important left-indigenous alliance in the Constitutional Assembly. Amidst 
national debate over the controversial TIPNIS road project, the Unity Pact split 
apart and realigned in 2011 after CIDOB (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas 
del Oriente Boliviano), the most important coalition of lowland indigenous 
groups and its highland counterpart CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y 
Markas del Qullasuyu), formally left the Pact. After the departure of CIDOB and 
CONAMAQ, the MAS focused on undermining lowland indigenous groups and 
encouraged government loyalists to form splinter factions aligned with the state 
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1.3 Impacts of Divided Indigenous Leadership 
There are various social, political and environmental impacts to the 
phenomenon of competing organizations that have divided communities and 
formed social rifts between families based on allegiances to competing leadership 
organizations. This crisis of political legitimacy erodes effective community 
advocacy for collective goods at higher levels of government due to infighting 
and a lack of consolidated support for issues of general concern. For example, on 
March 31, 2017 in TCO Guarayo, a street fight broke out between local 
leadership organizations over proposed changes to the Comprehensive Forest 
Reserve Law. The organic COPNAG, headed by democratically elected leader 
Daniel Yaquirena, organized a protest march to the municipal coliseum in the 
town of Ascensión de Guarayos where the meeting between local officials and 
the parallel COPNAG organization led by Eladio Uraeza was taking place. 
Daniel and allies claim the proposed changes to the forestry law would increase 
deforestation and environmental degradation in TCO Guarayo. When the two 
groups met one another, a confrontation and fight ensued and the parallel 
COPNAG retreated from the larger organic group (Désther 2017). When I 
interviewed Yaquirena about the situation he explained:  
The parallel COPNAG is getting kickbacks from selling logs in the 
protected TCO areas and the Forestry Department allows the colonists 
into the TCO. We don’t want them to enter because we are Guarayo and 
this is our territory. Why not kick out the soy and cattle ranchers? I was 
offered a bribe for 1000 dollars to keep quiet about the 5000 families that 
entered the TCO this year. I told them, I don’t want the money. The 
government and the other parallel organization are complicit in all of this. 
In order to control TCO Guarayo, the government says here is the money 
to keep quiet. 
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 Similarly, when I interviewed the president of a local indigenous women's 
cooperative in Ascención de Guarayos, the region’s largest town, she explained 
that COPNAG and her own organization received no money from the 
government. While touring the organic COPNAG building the roof visibly leaked 
and there was evidence of water damage in several areas where tiles had failed. 
When asked about the parallel organizations and her relationship with the 
government, she replied:  
The campesinos have not consulted us to create communities in the TCO. 
If they asked us in an assembly, this would be different. The TCO is more 
than 1.4 million hectares. We asked the government to stop the situation 
with the colonists. The TCO is big, but it is broken into 3 parts and 27,000 
hectares have been cut last year. We have asked the municipality to stop 
the cutting but they have not done anything. There is one project named 
Mayi where they cut everything then sell the land and let colonists live on 
it. If we block the roads there are criminals that will build others. They 
have money and without the government’s help we cannot do anything.  
 
          Additional interviews suggest the primary beneficiaries of the crisis of 
local leadership brought on by parallel organizations is the central government, 
multinational corporate interests, and Santa Cruz elites who are able to take their 
pick of organizations on the local level to find favorable arrangements for land 
and resource deals. While indigenous infighting markedly reduces resistance to 
extractive interests because communities are often too busy fighting amongst 
themselves to collectively work towards greater goods.  
While legal logging operations take place in TCOs under a various of 
forestry management plans, quasi-legal or illegal deforestation, mining, drilling, 
and colonist coca production has increased as TCO sovereignty erodes and 
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becomes more accessible to coca production and distribution. Guarayo and 
Chiquitano peoples reported increases in drug trafficking since the formation of 
parallel organizations at the local level - with illegal drug trafficking and small 
aircraft landing strips cut deep in the forest. These reports are partially confirmed 
by a recent article by C. Pena and Lillo Vaca in the newspaper El Deber on July 
14, 2017 where police found a cocaine laboratory capable of producing between 
150 - 200 kilos of cocaine per week in the forest outside of Concepcion in TCO 
Monte Verde on the banks of the Rio Negro river on the Brazilian border. Police 
estimated that - due to the remoteness of the site - it would be over $800,000 US 
dollars to construct the facility. The sophisticated surveillance at the lab allowed 
all the drug traffickers to leave the area before law enforcement arrived. In the 
Guarayo TCO, local sources explained that the drug trafficking is also increasing.  
These examples are illustrative of the asymmetrical power relations 
between outside actors - whether they are public or private, legal or illegal, 
extractivists of various forms make use of the institutional power vacuum created 
by weak and vying local indigenous interests, along with the relative remoteness 
of TCOs. When and if law enforcement become involved in counter-narcotics 
operations, this may only legitimate the militarization of indigenous territories, 
simultaneously fostering state access, while delegitimizing indigenous 
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1.4 Indigenous Responses to Territorial Threats  
Despite barriers, the organic COPNAG leadership continues to address 
certain forms of illegal logging in TCOs to the extent representatives are able. 
Legally, TCO lands are indivisible and cannot be sold, however, in practice, with 
parallel groups, corrupt lawyers produce fraudulent land titles for colonists and 
outside interests. An economically destitute highland indigenous population 
living in rural poverty also exacerbates inter-indigenous conflicts over TCO 
lands. One Guarayo leader responsible for overseeing forestry and lands 
explained that he interferes with approximately 10 cases of illegal land or logging 
sales per year. Often, indigenous families living in the TCO attempt to sell land 
to colonists, or trees to logging companies, to either (1) pay for a family 
member’s medical expenses (2) to acquire a percentage of wood to build a 
structure, or (3) sell land to a colonist for profit. In cases where an illegal 
transaction takes place, an elected representative of the community directly 
confronts the individual or family that chose to sell land or resources. After the 
COPNAG representative explains the legal basis for TCO lands as indivisible and 
unsalable to outsiders - most families return the money to the logging company or 
colonist. While some of these illegal land deals are blocked, others are allowed or 
occur without the knowledge of local leaders. Based on interviews with loggers 
and indigenous community members, at the time of writing, the going rate paid to 
locals by a logging company for an old growth hardwood tree (other than 
mahogany which is currently illegal to cut) is approximately 80 Bolivians, or 
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$11.60 dollars. One logger I interviewed admitted that this price was, “ridiculous, 
a joke.”  
The sale of resources and land is understandable given the bleak 
economic picture for a majority of rural people living in TCO Guarayo. When I 
asked an indigenous Guarayo leader about his organization’s level of state 
funding, he passionately explained that, “I tell you that there are no organizations 
that help us - all are bought from the municipality,” and went on to explain the 
main problems that he encountered in both his elected role as a community 
leader. Explaining that while most of the older colonists who live in the TCO are 
respectful because they know Guarayo leaders, the new waves of colonists are 
often aggressive and violent towards indigenous people. In the absence of state 
support, locals sometime make pragmatic alliances with unlikely actors. 
While visiting a rural community in TCO Guarayo, I happened to 
comment on a new motorcycle bridge across the large Rio Negro river that 
allowed transport between communities during the rainy season. One of my 
indigenous guides mentioned the bridge had been built with funds made possible 
by the right wing mayor of Santa Cruz Ruben Costas who financed the bridge’s 
construction. Costas is infamous for making racist remarks towards indigenous 
peoples, include calling Morales an “animal” or a “monkey” (Kozloff 2008). 
Costas belongs to a Santa Cruz elite that represented cattle and big agriculture - 
vertically integrated landowners with vested interests in the continued 
expropriation of indigenous TCO lands. Costas had met with the US Ambassador 
Philip Goldberg in Santa Cruz and fostered state’s concern that the US was 
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attempting to support the right-wing opposition movement (Kozloff 2008). When 
asked why Guarayo people would support Costas, an avowed racist, I was told: 
Evo doesn’t visit the small communities in the lowlands like ours, just the 
main towns in an area, like Ascención de Guarayos. He only knows the 
city, not the countryside - especially the highlands. At least Costas goes to 
the communities. He has drilled wells, built bridges, because of this, 
people respect him. 
          These pragmatic right-indigenous alliances work against the left-
indigenous coalitions needed to form a strong alternative leftist party capable of 
challenging the MAS at the voting booth in the near term. As the lowland 
indigenous movements becomes increasingly alienated from the MAS, 
particularly over the TIPNIS conflict, a strategic realignment characterized by 
tacit agreements between right wing cruceños elites and some indigenous 
communities are increasing based on a shared desire for autonomy from the state. 
Even though indigenous and cruceño elites occupy opposite sides of the 
socioeconomic spectrum, both have adopted libertarian anti-government rhetoric 
critical of state interventionism when impactful of local livelihoods. Although 
seemingly unlikely for indigenous communities to side with those that a few 
generations ago held their grandparents in near slavery conditions on haciendas, 
these are the tactics of non-aligned place-based indigenous social movement 
repertoires, or what Derrick Hindery terms dynamic pragmatism - indigenous 
peoples employing a fluid decision making process that evaluates practical 
outcomes and makes instrumental decisions within a limited political terrain 
(2013). Despite the contradictions, Guarayo communities may choose to 
accommodate Costas, leverage international environmental organizations support 
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and resist state-sponsored extraction within a flexible landscape that changes over 
time.   
 
1.5 State Repression of Lowland Indigenous-NGO Alliances 
Indigenous efforts to realize autonomy and sovereignty often encounter 
varying degrees of opposition from governments, “who invoke their own 
sovereignty to justify treating native bodies, territories, and rights as sacrificial 
for the sake of modernity, development, and nationhood, often deploying the 
myth of liberal equality against native claims” (Gustafson 2009:990). In the 
Bolivian case, the MAS extols indigeneity and Andean-Amazonian-Capitalism as 
a means to achieving national independence from various forms of colonialism 
and underdevelopment. Vice President Linera asserts that achieving credible 
socialism in the near term is impossible because of weakness of the present 
Bolivian economy and society. Thus, to achieve lasting socialism, Linera argues 
that, ‘Bolivia must remain capitalist for the next fifty to a hundred years’ (Polet 
2013). Thus, the MAS government’s decision to advance capitalist policies under 
the guise of long term socialist goals is termed reconstituted neoliberalism by 
political scientist Jeffrey Webber (2011:177). Although purportedly in the 
interests of all citizens, state policies have generated a protective autonomist 
response from many local groups with disparate interests and class positions.  
Whereas far right movements in Santa Cruz, have autonomous, even 
secessionist, elements vis-a-vis the state, for the purposes of this piece, the 
sovereignty or autonomy movements of Bolivian indigenous peoples of the 
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lowlands is understood solely in terms of regaining ancestral territories and 
increasing self-determination (Hansen, Blom, & Stepputat. 2006). This self-
determination, in the Guarayo case, is indicative of democratically elected de 
facto and de jure recognition of land and resource rights, and the administrative 
capacity to effectively manage these spaces. In broader terms, indigenous 
communities of the eastern lowlands and NGO allies, encounter increasing levels 
of resistance when the MAS contests regional notions of indigenous sovereignty 
under the similar banner of the greater indigenous national interest - often 
directly oppositional to local needs. These competing indigenous discourses will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
In a 2011 report, the NGO Fundacion Tierra concluded the status of the 
approximately 20 million hectares of TCO lands in the process of titling is, 
“paradoxical … because a government that has titled large amounts of TCOs and 
hectares, in turn is restricting the exercise of rights that are recognized with this 
ownership, such as the right to consultation, self-government, to indigenous 
autonomy. So, the application to the rights … of titles is the new challenge for 
indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state itself (PIEB 2011). This contradictory 
language from the state, on the one hand recognizing indigenous land rights and 
on the other exploiting resources without consultation - has inspired many 
lowland indigenous leaders to label the state’s rhetoric as a doble discurso 
(double discourse) to describe the dissonance between state rhetoric and action, 
and highlight the contradictions between the government’s anti-neoliberal 
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rhetoric and the continuation of neoliberal policies termed by Linera as, ‘Andean 
Amazonian capitalism.’  
Referencing the state’s discourse of equality and democracy, lowland 
leaders sarcastically recite Orwell’s famous line from Animal Farm, “all animals 
are equal, but some are more equal than others.” At present, the state holds the 
right to exploit subsoil resources within TCOs, creating tensions between 
government-sponsored extraction and indigenous autonomy - with both actors 
dependent on the same resource exploitation (Anthias). With local territorial 
autonomy claims requiring economic revenue streams sufficient to allow internal 
governance and organizing, not to mention basic health, education, 
transportation, some indigenous groups who oppose state-sponsored extraction 
are sometimes forced to sell non-renewable resources to fund organizing efforts. 
For example, Fernando Vargas, a community leader organizing against the 
TIPNIS road allegedly illegally sold wood from the reserve. However, Vargas 
claimed the sale was done under a legal forest management plan and MAS 
affiliates were attempting to discredit their political rivals (Mealla & Condori 
2012).  
Indigenous allied NGO workers reported similar grievances concerning a 
hostile state. On August 14, 2015, the MAS launched an attack against four 
prominent NGOs while TIPNIS road protests were ongoing. The publicly 
criticised NGOs were, (1) Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia 
(CEDIB), (2) Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario 
(CEDLA), (3) Fundación Milenio and (4) Fundación Tierra (Layme 2015). The 
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state’s decision to crack down on these groups, who remain significant in the 
long-term capacity building of lowland indigenous peoples, comes under the 
guise of anti-foreign interventionism - with reference to allegations against 
USAID for covert operations under the guise of aid. This is a strategic narrative 
on the part of the state to delegitimize NGOs who support capacity-building 
among indigenous groups. In the midst of this crackdown, NGOs also suffer from 
limited funding sources. One long time Bolivian aid worker described the general 
decades-long trend to explain why indigenous allied NGOs are no longer able to 
offer the same level of resources they once did: 
In the 1980s, the social democracies of Europe were pouring money 
into the indigenous civil society organizations in Bolivia during the 
neoliberal period. But for the last 5 - 10 years the money has been 
decreasing to Bolivian NGOs and indigenous groups as the European 
countries moved to the right (politically) and focus on domestic 
priorities like immigration and terrorism in their own countries. When 
the  Bolivian government was neoliberal, the social democracies of 
Europe didn’t agree and wanted to support indigenous peoples. But 
when Morales was elected, his words were much better and the 
Europeans did not have the same energy to help civil society. 
 
      During the 1980s and 90s, the confluence of media attention on the 
Amazon, popularity of democratic mass movements across Latin America, 
transnational alliances with northern allies and Amazonian peoples’ effective 
framing of their, “struggles for land rights and self-determination in 
environmental terms that northern publics could comprehend” made an effective 
case for indigenous self-determination being tied to environmental outcomes 
(Pieck 2006:309). Yet, indigenous cultural capital has waned, partly due to 
skepticism of the idealized notion of the “ecologically noble savage” (Redford 
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1993) and the absence of the Amazon in mass media coverage over the last 
decade (Pieck 2006). 
  As a result of the contraction of these NGOs the general consensus from 
rural indigenous communities is that the situation - specifically relating to 
indigenous TCO lands - has become worse each year. Eroding conditions under 
Morales are also attributed to foreign and domestic agribusiness, mining, logging 
and colonist activities pushing Bolivia’s agricultural frontier further into the 
forests. These vertically integrated, capital intensive, mechanized agribusiness 
models also reduce the need for labor (McKay & Colque 2015) while increasing 
economic growth and exportation-dependencies that exacerbate socio-
environmental conflicts (Bebbington 2009). Despite criticism, the state 
legitimizes extractivism as a long term developmental policy that fulfills the 
greater good. In an interview, Vice President Linera summarizes the paradox of 
TCO sovereignty vis-a-vis state interests:  
In the case of the minority indigenous peoples in the lowlands, the 
state has consolidated millions of hectares as historic territoriality of 
many peoples with a low population density. But combined with the 
right of a people to the land is the right of the state, of the state led by 
the Indigenous-popular and campesino movement, to superimpose the 
greater collective interest of all the peoples. And that is how we are 
going to go forward (Linera 2009).  
 
      Poverty reduction statistics support Linera’s argument that the nation 
has improved in some respects - with World Bank data indicating that poverty 
rates declined from 66.4% in 2006 to 38.6% in 2015.2 Critics, including the 
                                               
2 For a full report of World Bank poverty data on Bolivia see here: 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia 
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sociologist Luis Tapia argue that, "the excess of commodity exports has not been 
used to transform production, but rather to lubricate clientele networks to 
increase society's' political control and facilitate the rise of a new bourgeoisie.” 
Tapia was once a colleague of Linera in the struggle against neoliberalism during 
the Cochabamba Water War of 2000 and Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005. But like 
many former intellectuals who were part of early movements against 
neoliberalism, he has become a strong critic of the MAS.  
On June 22, 2011, Tapia, and three dozen prominent Bolivian intellectuals 
and social movement organizers including; Raúl Prada, Raquel Gutiérrez, Rafael 
Quispe, Yajaira San Martín, Oscar Olivera, and Pablo Mamani - wrote an 8-page 
public statement to the MAS titled, Manifesto: For the Recovery of the Process of 
Change With and For the People. The documents outline various grievances 
these public intellectuals have with the government and argues that the, “majority 
of our people basically find themselves in the same situation of poverty, 
precariousness, and anguish in which they have always been … five years after 
the nationalization, the transnationals still control our hydrocarbon resources … 
(with) more debt to be carried on the shoulders of the Bolivian people … mother 
earth has been abused and damaged” (Almaraz, et. al. 2011).  
In a hopeful sign that Bolivia retains some space for public debate, Linera 
responded to the manifesto with a 166-page response titled:“NGOism, An 
Infantile Right-Wing Disorder,” arguing that some NGOs have become, “the 
vehicle for introducing a type of colonial environmentalism that relegates the 
indigenous peoples to the role of caretakers of the Amazon jungle … creating de 
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facto a new relationship of privatization and alienation of the national parks and 
Communitarian Lands (TCOs) over which the state itself has lost custody and 
control” (Linera 2011). He continues by claiming that, “the NGO, as an 
organization of another government and possessor of financial resources, defines 
the subject matter, the focus, the line of funding, etc. based on the priorities of 
this other government, constituting itself as a foreign power within the national 
territory.” (Linera 2012). In a separate 2011 article in the Bolivian newspaper 
Pagina Siete, the Vice President asserted that some NGOs, like USAID and IBIS, 
“lie and misrepresent information to make policy and defend interests of 
transnational corporations,” and went on to call these groups, "Green Trotskyists, 
who for money have changed their ideology." Before they were "staunch 
defenders of industrialization" and now "beware that (you must) not touch a petal 
or tree." (Layme 2015). This public interchange outlines some of the ideological 
tensions between the state and civil society groups and is characteristic of the 
rapid breakdown of trust between state and civil society in recent years. The 
government’s main source of fodder for legitimating harsh treatment of NGOs 
comes from the complex history of US interventionism disguised as development 
in Bolivia. 
Well documented practices of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), include the agency’s support for right-wing groups in the 
country who mobilized to destabilize the MAS and promote neoliberalism 
(Burron 2012). USAID officially began operating its first development project in 
Bolivia in April 1964 (USAID 2000:10). In the earlier 2000s, the program 
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implemented “soft” tactics to foster economic stability during the first presidency 
of Sánchez de Lozada. However, USAID’s relationship changed as the county’s 
political terrain shifted towards a less-US aligned government with the election of 
Evo Morales when the agency shifted strategies towards ““hard” tactics, 
including support for the right-wing departments of the western part of the 
country, where autonomist forces mobilized to destabilize the MAS after Morales 
won the presidential elections in December 2005” (Burron 2011:1). Under the 
context of USAID participating in political meddling, the MAS officially 
expelled the agency from Bolivia in 2013 - part of an effort among several Pink 
Tide countries to sever connections with what many consider imperialist 
institutions. USAID denies the claims made by the Bolivian state (USAID 2016). 
The optics of the expulsion of USAID from the country amid charges of foreign 
interventionism remains a liability many indigenous-aligned NGOs must contend 
with as the state continues to provide the political justification for heavy handed 
tactics. 
A recent example of this state persecution occurred when CEDIB was 
evicted from their office with only 2 days’ notice. Although the organization had 
been housed in the building for more than 20 years, the head of the publically run 
University Mayor de San Simon (UMSS) forced the NGO to leave under the 
pretext of installing a new Chinese institute in the building. The university head 
is politically aligned with the MAS according to Marco Gandarillas Director of 
CEDIB (Hill 2017). This eviction forced CEDIB to move tens of thousands of 
books and millions of documents under stressful conditions. An aid worker I 
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interviewed described how the government suddenly requested that his 
organization provide over ten years of tax and accounting records immediately in 
order to remain in compliance with state regulations. These stories of arbitrary 
hurdles are common for NGOs who support indigenous rights, while less 
politicized organizations do not receive this type of harassment. These records 
requests, the eviction of CEDIB, and a host of other challenges are part of a 
larger state strategy to harass and deplete resources from organizations that 
challenge government authority. By making NGOs use valuable staff time and 
resources to meet bureaucratic arbitrarily enforced benchmarks - their jobs 
become more difficult and when an organization fails to meet requests, licenses 
may be revoked, fines levied, or NGOs exiled from the country - in the case of 
international NGOs. The state is sending a message that all who work in civil 
society hear clearly: ‘be careful or we will make your lives difficult.’ 
The government crackdown against these civil society organizations is 
significant because over fifty former or current members of the MAS government 
worked for the same NGOs now under attack and are aware of the efficacy of 
these groups in bringing about social change. For example, the Deputy Minister 
of Communication Claudia Espinoza, the Administrator of Planning Viviana 
Caro and Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rubén Gamarra were former 
employees of the NGO CEDLA - Center for Studies on Labor and Agrarian 
Development. The prior Minister of the Interior, Rafael Puente was part of 
CEDIB - Documentation and Information Center of Bolivia - and the current 
Deputy Minister of Planning, Diego Pacheco, worked at Fundación Tierra 
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(Espinoza 2015). The state’s intimate knowledge of the power of these NGOs to 
provide resources for indigenous groups, expose human rights abuses and 
document environmental impacts of extraction have certainly influenced the 
state’s relationship to these groups today after political realignments.  
Similarly, TCO communities that do not show loyalty to the MAS are 
often starved of resources. Parallel leadership organizations aligned with the 
government are supported while the organic democratically elected leadership is 
strategically ignored by government administrators who receive remunerations 
from hydrocarbon rents and other resource concessions. One long time Guarayo 
leader explained the state’s strategy:   
Since Evo was elected, the central government no longer allows 
communities to be compensated directly because of the assumption that 
they can’t be trusted. But instead, the government receives from 
extraction and gives money to the Indigenous Fund who then gives it to 
communities. 
The Indigenous Fund remains a national scandal and oft-cited example of 
the failures of centralized administrative corruption and mismanagement - with 
some representatives who were found responsible for various scandals spending 
time in prison. There are several notable exceptions to the centralized 
nationalization of resources. When redistribution does not occur, indigenous 
organizations, parallel or organic, may seek to deal directly with multinational 
corporations in a Faustian bargain for access to hydrocarbon rents (Anthias 
2016). Community sources mention that in the face of economic austerity, native 
peoples are often forced to illegally sell off trees, land or other resources adjacent 
to their homes to pay for an illness in the family or other major expense. One 
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seasoned development worker familiar with the internal dynamics of TCOs 
described the tension between competing visions of how resources may be used 
within TCOs - with the traditional indigenous family as one unit - and the 
community territory on the other:  
Families can garden and build a house and keep everything for 
themselves. They can cut trees for 4 reasons: to build a house, a hospital, 
a school or ...the fourth reason, to get money for the TCO community 
fund. The community leaders can sign a deal with an outside company to 
cut trees. Then the money is supposed to go into the account and is 
collectively decided upon. However, some community leaders will sell 
trees and take part of the money directly into their pockets. Or, for 
example, the loggers will say to the leader, “do you want this Toyota 
Tacoma? Then let us cut this area.” Then give the keys to the leader. 
 
Peaceful indigenous marches are sometimes met with state brutality. In 
efforts to promote the TIPNIS highway, Morales strategically deployed a 
machismo discourse, encouraging outside non-ethnically affiliated men to seduce 
women living in the TIPNIS in order to patriarchally stop their resistance to the 
proposed project. To counter this threat, indigenous marchers strategically use 
gender as a form of dynamic pragmatism - recognizing that the military is less 
likely to commit acts of violence against women within the context of a public 
protest. Traditional gendered relations are deployed, for example, in a non-violent 
march against the highway that resulted in a confront with the state.  
On September 24, 2011, a confrontation began between hundreds of 
protesters against riot police and colonists supportive of the highway. The 
Secretary of State arrived and spoke with the protesters. The situation was tense 
and the Secretary later reported to the media, “the women had surrounded me and 
there had already been problems. There had been some threats and they had 
  51 
forced me, they made me walk.” Although violence was averted, the next day, the 
police surrounded the 600 marchers, used tear gas on everyone, then proceeded to 
handcuff, gag protester’s mouths with tape and beat many before loading them 
onto buses. Resident coordination of the United Nations in Bolivia Yoriko 
Yasukawa called on the MAS, “I remind the authorities, at all levels, that their 
first responsibility is to stop this violence and to respect the rights of the people, 
the dignity of the indigenous marchers” (Cauthen 2012). 
Indigenous female leadership is increasingly integrated into a larger 
discussion of gendered power relations within indigenous communities. When 
extractivism occurs, the actual employment numbers are often limited to a few 
highly skilled positions often performed by men, making women more dependent 
on male wages and reducing the possibility for substantive gender equality 
(Fabricant & Gustafson 2015). The issue of transcending gender roles in 
indigenous communities is undergoing revision from a variety of factors. 
Indigenous women’s increasing levels of urbanization and education, in 
combination with NGO capacity building under the ideological and 
programmatic agendas for gender equality are also further empowering women 
(Postero 2007). As Postero notes in her important anthropological text Now We 
Are Citizens, on the Guarani of Bolivia, workers at the Santa Cruz-based NGO 
CEADES were pedagogically aligned with the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire 
and approached indigenous capacity building by encouraging women to 
participate in public discussions, a task that creates cultural contradictions for the 
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Guarani culture where, “women are...expected to defer to their husbands and 
fathers” (Postero 179:2007).  
According to Marqueza Seco, Presidenta of the Indigenous Women's sub-
center of the TIPNIS, people connected to the MAS actively, “recruit more and 
more people to change their minds and support the construction of the road” 
(Carilla 2017:1). Seco mentioned: “we don’t need a road, the river is the road.” 
When I interviewed Seco, she expressed concern for the future of the TIPNIS, 
saying: “we need to keep laws that protect mother earth and not eliminate the law 
180.” Law 180 passed in 2011 and declares that the TIPNIS remain an intangible 
zone and prevents the construction of roads that would transect the territory 
(Bustillos 2012). Seco admitted that, “we don’t have resources for the fight” and 
listed various basic necessities the movement needed to continue their resistance, 
including gas and oil for boats and transport within and between the territory and 
cities as well as materials for protest banners and more outreach to NGO allies. 
She also mentioned that besides fighting the government’s road building efforts, 
other incursions from drug and land traffickers was occurring. 
 
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I examined the impacts of the MAS crackdown on 
indigenous-NGO alliances and the related emerging threat of parallel 
organizations. I argue that both social phenomena are contributing to a territorial 
crisis in lowland TCOs that may eviscerate the substantive meaning of the term 
Native Community Lands and instead come to mean little more than a national 
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sacrifice zone of hyper-exploitation. NGOs remain central actors to the integrity 
of these territories by providing capacity building and carefully fostering the 
growth of nascent indigenous systems of TCO governance. Parallel leadership 
structures, often affiliated with the MAS, undermine community cohesion and 
political agency - as factors necessary for effective negotiation with extractive 
interests, development and general social welfare. The MAS crackdown on 
NGOs is facilitating the administrative power vacuum within native lands that is 
accelerating extractivism in TCOs. Just as urban slums have problems, so too do 
these TCO communities. Over time, these problems can, and have, been 
overcome with the right resources, technical skills, and networks of dedicated 
people from inside and outside the communities. Yet, this rare opportunity for 
indigenous self-determination within a communal land base is rapidly being 
eroded. This precious opening in the arc of history should be allowed to develop 
according to the unique needs and aspirations of the inhabitants. Although there 
is considerable animosity, much of the political infighting could be addressed 
through sincere dialogue between the MAS and lowland leaders. The very fact 
that right wing elites have made minor inroads into indigenous communities is a 
testament to the many opportunities that exist for the state to begin providing 
minor funds to organic leadership organizations - rather than supporting rival 
parallel groups.   
Unfortunately, the TIPNIS road project exemplifies the breakdown in 
communication between state and indigenous lowland territories characterized by 
increased levels of authoritarian decision-making that frames sincere social 
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movements within TCOs as simply barriers to the country’s development goals. 
Under these conditions, challenges to indigenous territorial autonomy are likely 
to increase and generate continued animosity. I have also described how the 
government’s broken promises are not the result of a weak administrative state 
unable to grapple with complex bureaucracies, but rather the result of two factors, 
where (1) earlier patterns of governance and path dependencies propelled the 
MAS into a reliance on extractivism and (2) because of the pressure to continue 
extraction, the state was forced to strategically undermined local indigenous and 
NGO agencies in order to more easily access resources. Under this new 
paradigm, former allies are framed as new opponents and  indigenous-NGO 
coalitions that brought the MAS to power are seen as direct threats to hegemony  
This dynamic is now common in center left Latin American governments 
of the Pink Tide, despite a rhetoric of ecological socialism and multicultural 
indigeneity, the bureaucratic reality of an administrative state encountering the 
prescribed political-economic parameters of hundreds of years of extractivism 
prevails. The state’s treatment of the remaining indigenous social movements of 
the eastern lowlands and their NGO allies, remains a litmus test for regional 
dynamics. In the near term, the ongoing TIPNIS struggle represents the most 
visible indicator of the relationship between state vis-a-vis civil society. The 
MAS’s entrenchment in extractivism as a financial engine for overcoming 
underdevelopment is increasingly challenged, yet as of yet, no significant 
alliances have risen to challenge the political supremacy of Morales.  
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The Morales Administration increasingly represents a model of capitalist 
extractivism that I argue is indicative of the pressure towards institutional 
isomorphism. Accelerated rates of resource extraction at the national level and 
state crackdown at the local level indicates the advanced condition of institutional 
transformation the MAS has already undergone. As an NGO worker explained, 
“the superstructure of the government produces the same processes at all levels 
and reproduces the discourses of mercantilism and individualism.” State-
affiliated parallelism also represents an ideological struggle between modernist 
individualistic values and more communal ways - with vastly different political-
economic repercussions. An NGO director described how parallel groups are, 
“the vehicle of the government that represents the intercultural identity of the 
campesino that is fundamentally different than the indigenous identity. The 
NGOs are part of the indigenous movement and continue to give indigenous 
peoples institutional support, so the NGOs represent a threat to the government.” 
State antagonism threatens NGO-indigenous coalitions that have suffered in 
recent years. While legal TCO land titling processes remain stagnant while 
roadbuilding and hydrocarbons extraction increase. The Guarayo case is 
indicative of these larger dynamics where ideological divides between those who 
value accessing the land for subsistence clash with parallel organizations seeking 
to exploit the TCO for profit. The state’s crackdown on specific NGOs who assist 
lowland indigenous groups represents a concerted effort to cut the few remaining 
sources of funding and capacity building to local democratic governance. Thus, 
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increasing risk for both native land tenure and the nascent governance structures 
of indigenous inhabitants and the ecosystem survival of the Bolivian Amazon.  
NGO-indigenous alliances remain a key element of both human rights and 
environmental protection in Bolivia and across Latin America. Although 
community relationships are undergoing radical transformations in livelihoods, 
relationships to the government, gender roles, and political fracturing - 
opportunities remain for domestic and international coalitions to advocate for 
better resource use alternatives. In the subsequent chapters of this work, I 
describe other key tensions and provide some preliminary exit strategies from the 































INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND ANDEAN-AMAZONIAN CAPITALISM 
 
Relations between the Bolivian MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) 
government and indigenous-NGO alliances have eroded in recent years over 
profound disagreements over development policies on native community lands 
(TCOs, Tierra Comunitaria de Origen). This political-economic schism pits 
lowland indigenous social movements and their NGO allies against a government 
dependent on royalties from extraction. Within this chapter, I historicize, 
contextualize, and analyze these emerging tensions between state-sponsored 
extractivism vis-a-vis NGO-indigenous alliances. I make several assertions about 
the nature of these conflicts and the contradictions between the Bolivian 
government’s indigenous ecosocialist rhetoric and accelerated extractivism. 
Trends representative of larger dynamics throughout Latin America’s center-Left 
‘Pink Tide’ countries.  
Using a theory-driven approach I ask: Why is the Morales government 
cracking down on NGO-indigenous coalitions and in what respects is these 
national phenomena indicative of regional dynamics? How has the MAS 
managed to build a popular hegemony and in what ways are indigenous social 
movements asserting their own counter-hegemonic narratives in defense of 
territory? I use fieldwork among lowland indigenous groups and affiliated NGOs 
currently targeted by the government to explore civil society efforts to contest 
state power. I approach the topic by exploring the historical roots of the MAS 
party’s creation of a Left-indigenous popular hegemony through one of the 
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country’s most important public intellectuals, Bolivian Vice President Álvaro 
García Linera. 
I employ a social movement theoretical approach to trace the ways in 
which MAS party officials consciously deploy the political strategies of Antonio 
Gramsci, and other processes designed to undermine critics, and craft common 
sense. I claim that state efforts to crack down on NGOs is a strategy to undermine 
indigenous capacity building and degrade land sovereignty as a barrier to 
extraction. Recent land and resource disputes between the government and 
indigenous-NGO coalitions, most famously in the TIPNIS conflict, can be partly 
explained by applying the political elements of social movement scholars 
Douglas McAdam and Charles Tilly’s Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) as 
well as concepts from Antonio Gramsci - whose analysis of the ways in which 
hegemonic state power functions remains useful for mapping the political terrain 
of the body politic.  
Along with Ecuador, Bolivia remains a bellwether of emerging trends in 
Leftist Latin American countries where revolutionary social movements toppled 
authoritarian neoliberal governments in the 2000s and radically rewrote 
constitutions to give parity to women, indigenous peoples and the environment  
while intensifying non-renewable resource extraction (Farthing and Riofrancos 
2017). Are these contradictions the result of cognitive dissonance, political 
corruption, or larger structural constraints? How could the government enshrine 
indigenous people’s legal rights to communal lands while simultaneously 
accelerating the destruction of these territories under agro-industrial practices? 
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Interrogating these fundamental contradictions within Bolivia is crucial for better 
understanding the ways in which the world system of global capital stifles 
alternative livelihoods while theorizing possibilities for emancipatory life 
projects based on indigenous and eco-socialist worldviews during the twilight of 
the U.S. empire.  
 
2. Historical Background 
The term extractivism is defined within this paper under three parameters 
where (1) resources are extracted on a large scale or high intensity, (2) raw 
materials undergo very little processing and (3) materials are mostly for export 
(Gudynas 2013). Social movement coalitions are defined as distinct organizations 
who pool resources to seek shared objectives (Levi & Murphy 2006). The 
Andean cosmovision adopted by Bolivia’s new 2009 constitution is perhaps most 
succinctly summarized in the Vivir Bien (living well) approach that legally 
recognizes indigenous worldviews (Fernández 2009). While the Mother Earth 
Law is often considered the most radical environmental law in the world 
(Hindery 2014). However, an amended version: the Framework Law of Mother 
Earth and Integral Development for Living Well (La Ley Marco de la Madre 
Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien), passed in 2012, underwent 
significant revisions that fundamentally altered the original document. This 
second law was an attempt to synthesize two disparate development paradigms. 
On the one hand, maintaining progressive ecological visions from indigenous 
movement coalitions under the Pact of Unity while simultaneously promoting an 
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extractivist agenda of the MAS based on mining and hydrocarbons extraction as a 
compatible model with the notion of Vivir Bien (Hindery 2014:218).  
This syncretism of worldviews and the contradictory assertion that 
extractivism is compatible with the principles of the new constitution has led 
some lowland indigenous leaders to describe the MAS’ cognitive dissonance as a 
double discourse. This mismatch is particularly salient within the context of the 
national debate over the TIPNIS highway, the highest profile land conflict 
between civil society and the Bolivian state within recent years. The political 
economic reasons for the road are well documented. The government’s proposed 
road through the TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure) 
places the MAS party’s cocalero union base against lowland indigenous-NGO 
coalitions who want to protect the zone against development. A Brazilian bank is 
the main financier of the road which passes through transnational hydrocarbon 
concessions (oil blocks) within the heart of the park. Besides undermining the 
legally protections of indigenous territories and national park status, the highway 
would further a massive neoliberal development initiative known as IIRSA 
(Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America), a 12-
country highway project designed to integrate remote areas into the regional 
market (Hindery 2014).  
According to former indigenous leader Fernando Vargas, the road’s 
construction would appease Morales’ cocalero political constituents, the Six 
Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba, where approximately 35,000 coca 
growers of the Chapare region seek additional suitable lands that would be made 
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possible by road access. TIPNIS lands are well suited for growing coca and have 
a population of readily available poor colonists already colonizing the southern 
portion park known as Polygon 7 the proposed road would transect. The readily 
available TIPNIS land and labor is an excellent opportunity for significant 
expansion of coca production and profit from both legal and illegal sales - not to 
mention a precedent setting example of eroding other protected areas across the 
country.  
Agricultural areas suitable for coca growing are in short supply due to the 
country’s continuing legacy of maldistributed lands. The 1952 revolution and 
Agrarian Reform Law’s redistribution initiatives failed to significantly shift land 
ownership to the poor majority and allowed many elites to retain their great 
estates. Landless peasant movement pressures to colonize, and redistribute arable 
lands increased after the Agrarian Reforms for a period of 30 years (Crabtree and 
Whitehead 2001). However, the incomplete promise of substantive land 
distribution was not obtained, and the hands of time were pushed back to an 
earlier era of distribution characteristic of the neoliberal epoch of cattle barons 
and destitute peasants. At the beginning of Morales’ presidency, a 2005 World 
Bank Report found that, “almost 10 percent of the existing agricultural units 
(almost 60,000 units) control 90 percent of agricultural territory” (2005). The 
MAS did institute changes that are perhaps best described as titling and 
legalization programs rather than agrarian reform (Kay & Urioste 2007). These 
programs were less substantive than agrarian reforms in several ways where (1) 
occupied lands were simply regularized or legalized, and (2) mainly public lands 
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were distributed - rather than expropriated from large private landowners - 
making the land distribution data look more favorable (Sauer & Leite 2012). 
Additionally, consolidation of huge hectare plots by large landholders was 
occurring simultaneously. In all, “of the 28.2 million hectares of land officially 
distributed up to 2014, close to 15 million hectares (53%) were titled” as 
TCOs/TIOCs (Vergara-Camus & Kay 2017:418). The MAS also gave land to 
large and medium sized owners - (approximately 14% of total redistributed lands) 
and 56 titles to 5,000-hectare properties (Webber 2011). All of these 
redistribution efforts occurred within the context of a global market that had 
stripped thousands from their jobs in the mines and laid the stage for the massive 
revolts that brought Morales to power.  
  
2.1 The Great Tin Crash 
The great tin crash of 1985 forced many ex-miners off the Altiplano and 
into the lower elevation Chapare regions to grow coca - although others settled 
into the new slum city of El Alto that overlooks La Paz. These ex-miners 
established cocalero (coca grower) unions. Cocaleros and other displaced peasant 
colonists often view national parks as easier to access than large privately-owned 
estates in other parts of the country where the risk of direct conflict is greater 
(Webber 2012). In addition to colonist land pressures, transnational oil 
companies hold oil concessions within the park that have already been signed 
(Mendoza 2017). Given pressures from (1) regional cocaleros, (2) national 
infrastructure and (3) international extraction, there is significant strain from both 
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inside and outside the MAS to undermine protected TCO and national park 
statuses to appease these interests. The TIPNIS conflict is also unfortunately 
indicative of larger constitutional and ideological incongruities that places 
cocalero and extractivist interests in direct conflict with lowland indigenous-
NGO alliances who view the MAS’ actions as an attack against ecology and 
indigenous sovereignty. These groups of highland cocaleros and lowland 
indigenous once worked together under strong coalitions - making the fight all 
the more bitter. 
Within the TIPNIS, the Mojeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré, and Tsimané 
peoples continue to hold legal claims to their TCO and largely oppose the project 
despite government pressures. Some TIPNIS locals critical of the road reported 
receiving threats, as well as government bribery and extortion. CPEM-B, (Central 
of Beni Ethnic Peoples), an indigenous coalitions that defends the area, released a 
public statement calling the government’s efforts to weaken the status of the park 
as a “direct affront and disrespect to the Indigenous Peoples of the TIPNIS 
territory” and asserting, “the government has lost respect for indigenous 
territories exposing them to the interests of transnational capital and other social 
sectors, jeopardizing the social and cultural existence and continuity of 
indigenous peoples” (Servindi 2017). These strong statements, in conjunction 
with nonviolent protests and marches, are clear indications of the seriousness of 
lowland indigenous group’s attitudes as government actions directly undermine 
both international standards and the 2009 constitutional mandate that indigenous 
peoples have the right to receive “free, prior, and informed consent” (Human 
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Rights Watch 2017). Those TIPNIS defenders interviewed indicated that 
although they faced many economic and political barriers, they expected to have 
further clashes with police and made the statements that they would defend their 
territories with their lives.  
Although the state claims the TIPNIS road building efforts are a poverty 
alleviation measure to bring schools and health services to isolated communities, 
that most TIPNIS residents support the project, and that movements that oppose 
the project are malcontents sponsored by foreign interests (Smith 2018). 
However, a brutal police crackdown on 1500 nonviolent protesters in 2011 forced 
Evo to publicly apologize after the high-profile event catalyzed public opinion in 
support of lowland indigenous rights to exercise freedom of speech against the 
highway (Achtenberg 9/30/2011). Another public relations blunder occurred 
when President Morales called for colonists to romantically pursue the TIPNIS 
women as a way to undermine resistance, encouraging his cocalero male base to, 
“go out and seduce the Yuracaré women” (Achtenberg, 12/8/2011) and told 
protesters, “sooner or later the road will be built” (Corz 2017). Despite, and 
perhaps because of the MAS’s brutal and crude tactics, organizing in the 
lowlands generated a national cry of solidarity that effectively halted road 
construction until August of 2017 when the government resumed the project amid 
ongoing public protests (Collyns 2017).  
The government, in seeking to undermine indigenous and NGOs has 
continued to slander leadership and make unsubstantiated allegations of their 
opponent’s illegal activities to derail movement activities (CIPCA 2006). NGO 
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sources claim the government produced false reports of free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) consultations of TIPNIS residents within the park - asserting a 
majority of communities supported the road. However, when third party monitors 
assessed the government’s TIPNIS survey, the review found the MAS used 
bribery and other forms of coercion to legitimate their argument that the legal 
standard for prior consent and consultation had been met (Fundacion Salon 
2017). According to a recent article by Myles McCormick in The Guardian, “a 
joint assessment by the International Federation of Human Rights, the Bolivian 
Permanent Assembly of Human Rights and the Catholic Church in 2016 
concluded that the consultation had been, “neither free nor informed and did not 
respect the principle of good faith” (McCormick 2017). The MAS attempts to 
undermine democratic processes within TCOs seriously damages credibility and 
further erodes public trust. 
Linera calls NGOs reporting on the social and environmental impacts of 
the road “park rangers” with the larger critique that, “NGO environmental 
activism promotes neocolonialism and threatens Bolivian sovereignty” 
(Achtenberg 2015). According to Brazilian Professor Ana Carolina Delgado who 
researches the TIPNIS, the road represents neither, but instead signifies the 
intensification of mining, hydrocarbons, big-agriculture, and other forms of 
extractivism destined for foreign markets (Delgado 2017). New York Times 
journalist Jean Friedman-Rudovsky points to the geopolitical significance of the 
road that if completed, “would likely be a major transport route for moving 
Brazilian soybeans to Pacific ports for shipment to China. Brazil’s oil giant, 
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Petrobras, also holds the hydrocarbon exploration rights inside TIPNIS near the 
planned highway” (Friedman-Rudovsky 2012). Based on increasing world 
demand for soy, principally as animal feed, agro-industrial interests remain a 
central driver of Amazonian deforestation. Bolivian agriculture remains one of 
the most important sectors of the economy and accounting for about 13% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 30% of the total labor force (World 
Bank 2017).  
Agro-industrial interests in the country are largely multinational in 
character and represent the vertically integrated monopolies that now dominate 
the world food system. According to business analysts although, “the 2009 
Bolivian Constitution established that domestic investment has priority over 
foreign investment” (Brauch 2014). Though under Bolivian law, land may not be 
owned by foreign direct investment interests, de facto control lies in 
multinational agribusiness. Eduardo Gudynas describes this changing power 
dynamic where, “transformation marked by management rather than ownership 
of land, with control over production processes, privatization of resources, 
outsourcing and commodification replacing traditional farming activities” 
(2008:512). Under this model, the Morales government allows Santa Cruz landed 
elites, as well as Russian, Japanese, and Mennonite immigrants from around the 
world to commodify and exploit Bolivian lands based on an economic model 
prioritizing agricultural giants including Cargill, ADM, and Dreyfus who hold 
monopolies over global agricultural markets. The result is de facto alienation of 
indigenous and peasant lands through deforestation, and myriad environmental 
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and social impacts concomitant with vertically integrated expansionist models. 
Further, power is eroded from Bolivian democratic processes in the context of 
global trade because:  
Decisions on agriculture are not determined by national policies, but by 
global dynamics. The role of the nation-state is weakened, and farmers 
and traders are linked into a global network of primary agricultural 
products, foodstuffs and agro fuels (Gudynas 2008:513).  
 
Soy agribusiness is the main driver of contemporary Amazonian 
deforestation (Graesser, Aide, Grau, and Ramankutty 2015). If the MAS seeks to 
emancipate the nation from neocolonialism and bolster national sovereignty - 
allowing rapid expansion of transnational corporate management is not the 
solution. Allowing local communities to enter markets with the government 
support would provide lasting benefits. I assert that the Morales Administration is 
targeting NGOs who call attention to these glaring extractivist contradictions in 
state development policy - as part of a larger government strategy to maintain 
control over popular hegemony. The dynamics between the state and NGO-
indigenous coalitions is not unique to Bolivia and represents a pattern between 
actors in center-Left states in Latin America, particularly Ecuador where state 
sponsored oil drilling in the Yasuni National Park and displacement of the 
Huaorani and Shuar indigenous peoples is comparable to the TIPNIS conflict 
(Estremadoiro 2013). 
Left-labor coalitions brought leaders including Morales, Correa, and 
Chavez into power in the early 2000s. Both Ecuador and Bolivia, despite holding 
mutually exclusive mandates around sustainability and extraction have significant 
political-economic trajectories outside of the global neoliberal orthodoxy and as 
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such, remain important crucibles for alternative systems outside of global 
capitalism. Analysis and critique of the Bolivian state repression of civil society 
must be understood as the product of centuries of plunder within a self-
replicating world system that undermine alternative development models, 
particularly nascent democratic systems that balance indigenous peoples’ rights 
and ecology. If meaningful democratic reforms are to be supported a rigorous 
examination of the material conditions of marginalized groups should be central. 
How these social movements organize, obtain resources, and build capacities, are 
key. Particularly because indigenous human rights have been among the most 
bitterly repressed by elite white supremacist interests in Latin America.  
 
2.2 Literature Review  
Social movement literature on resource mobilization theories and 
Gramscian political theory help clarify certain structural contradictions in Latin 
America in general and Bolivia in particular. After the brutal neoliberalization of 
the state in the mid 1980s under what Naomi Klein termed ‘shock therapy’ (Klein 
2007). Powerful inter-left coalitions arose to challenge the status quo and bring 
about emancipatory opportunities for democratic change in an effort to, in the 
words of historian Murray Bookchin, “grab the hands of time … and push history 
forward” (Morse 2011). This revolutionary period of left social movements was 
the most radical in modern Latin American history according to political scientist 
Jeffery Webber and succeeded in toppling the neoliberal governments of Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005 and providing a political 
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opening for Morales to become president in 2006 winning 54% of the popular 
vote (Webber 2017).  
I do not attempt an exhaustive overview of what has evolved into large, 
complex, and distinct bodies of literature on Latin American social movements, 
political theory and development. Rather, I focus on analyzing the contemporary 
political-economy of the Bolivian government’s crackdown on NGO-supported 
indigenous social movements by applying resource mobilization theory and 
certain elements of Antonio Gramsci’s theories on nation building that help 
contextualize power dynamics in the region within the arc of history. As a 
political theorist, his original contributions to understanding how class and social 
power are exercised and contested remains essential for studying the 
contemporary political terrain of Latin America. Gramsci is particularly 
important in Latin American political theory as non-Italian translations of the 
Prison Notebooks were first published in Spanish in Buenos Aires in 1950 - 
earlier than English translations (Allen & Ouviña 2017).  
As a political strategist, one of the central elements Gramscian theory 
offers is a divergence from classical Marxian generalizations of class conditions 
and an emphasis on regional specificity of poor and minority identity formation 
in building social movements through popular hegemony (Allen & Ouviña 2017). 
His focus on the development of political strategy remains crucial as a “roadmap 
to power”  by molding ‘common sense’ for ambitious figures including Bolivian 
Vice President Linera, and those across the political spectrum (The Economist 
2017). Gramsci also made important contributions to understanding how political 
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opportunity structures form in specific contexts and how these openings may be 
leveraged by social movements to gain power - and how intelligentsia may be 
able maintain it. While Gramsci’s insights into the nature of power are profound - 
his applicability to contemporary social movements is somewhat limited because 
the majority of his writings occurred over 80 years ago. I fill this lacuna by 
engaging other contemporary social movement theories to articulate 
contemporary understandings of the conditions under which new social 
movements succeed or fail. I do so by integrating resource mobilization theory 
into my analysis to assert that there is a specific political-economic basis for the 
MAS government’s antagonistic relationship towards indigenous allied NGOs.   
Resource mobilization (RM) theories arose during the 1970s as a means 
of analyzing social movements of the 1950s and 60s and as a rejection of two 
earlier social movement theories that either cast movement actors as deviant and 
anomic or a second pluralist theory that framed movement actors as having the 
reasonable ability to have their grievances addressed within the political process 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1988; Edwards & Gilham 2013). Resource 
mobilization theorists were instead interested in the ways in which marginalized 
social movement actors organized, not just around shared grievances, but based 
on mobilization strategies and opportunities in efforts to create change in the 
greater architecture of society (McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978; McCarthy & Zald 
1977).  
Resource mobilization scholars often focus on how marginalized social 
movement actors mobilize to seek redress for grievances and consider formal 
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organizations, such as NGOs, as important assets to collective action (McCarthy 
and Zald 1977). As Della Porta and Diani assert, it is not enough to explore 
conflicts between groups, we must understand the conditions under which 
grievances become transformed into mobilization. This shift into collective action 
is based on both material resources including money and services, and non-
material resources like the bonds of friendship, authority or engagement (Della 
Porta and Diani 2006). RM scholarship places particular emphasis on material 
resources needed to sustain movements because, “no matter how many other 
resources a movement mobilizes, it will incur costs and someone has to pay the 
bills” (Edwards & Gilham 2013:4). This sentiment was repeated by a Guarayo 
indigenous leader who noted that, “if you don’t have money, you can’t have 
autonomy,” signifying the importance of financial provided by NGOs and other 
allies in social movement struggles.  
That there is the need for resources to flow to these organizations in order 
to function is so obvious as to barely warrant mention. Further, that a hostile state 
should try to cut off the revenue streams to political opponents is equally 
straightforward. However, what is worth articulating is the ways in which these 
processes take place on the ground - between civil society groups and the 
government. Particularly when both sets of actors share a similar rhetoric of 
emancipatory politics and originate from radical leftist social movements. It is 
equally important to examine the ways in which the state employs legitimation 
strategies to silence dissent and control popular hegemony. As MAS officials 
commonly frame NGO-indigenous alliances as the product of foreign 
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interventionism and imperialism machinations. Further, how these organizations 
and movements choose to respond is worth exploring. Before delving into the 
details of these dynamics, it is important to briefly recount how the MAS was 
able to obtain consistently impressive electoral victories and build a popular 
hegemony to command the common-sense ideas of the diverse Bolivian 
population - a colonial locus for centuries of looting and staunch left-indigenous 
coalitions (Cusicanqui 1986). I provide a brief account of the intellectual 
trajectory of the current Vice President Álvaro García Linera who is considered 
by many to be the principle intellectual architect and Marxist theorist of the MAS 
party in its current form.  
 
2.3 Building Cultural Hegemony 
In October, 1967 the iconic revolutionary was executed by CIA affiliated 
Bolivian troops in a schoolhouse southwest of Santa Cruz, in the Guarani 
community of La Higuera - with help from Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie 
(Smith, 2007). Prior to Che’s capture, and despite his fame as a hero of the Cuban 
revolution, his diary mentions the inability of his small force to convert even one 
of the unfriendly peasants (Tobar 2004). Che attempted to mobilize the peasantry 
by appealing to their collective sense of injustice towards oppression. Yet, despite 
Bolivia’s deeply unequal hacienda system, one of the worse in the Americas, the 
indigenous peasants alerted the Bolivian military to Che’s location resulting in 
his assassination.  
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Almost 40 years later, and conscious of Che’s failures to engage the 
popular identities of indigenous-peasants, the future Vice President, Álvaro 
García Linera spent years seeking ways to mobilize subaltern peoples - relying 
explicitly on Gramsci’s work. His self-proclaimed objective: to build an effective 
hegemonic framework capable of mobilizing the left-indigenous base of the 
country under a common roof. As one of the most important Marxist theorists in 
the country and an accomplished organic intellectual capable of articulating the 
mass consciousness of the crowd. Linera’s prodigious writing on diverse subjects 
are well represented in academic scholarship - particularly his synthesis of 
indigenous and Marxist worldviews. A more thorough analysis can be explored 
in the works of the vice president himself (Linera 2014) and Feldman (2015), 
with additional insight on the growth of Linera’s political views accessible 
through the works of Webber (2015) and Baker (2015). 
This is background on the vice president and the ideological formation of 
the MAS, is a necessary beginning for historicizing the birth of the party. 
Linera’s place as both a public intellectual and politician grants researchers rare 
access examine his thought processes, and the ways in which obtaining power 
changes a person. Linera’s continued scholarship, intellectual objectives, and 
responses to critics, are equally rare (Linera 2011). The arc of Linera’s political 
career; from intellectual, radical activist, prisoner, television personality, to 
political figure, represents an example of what Gramsci termed the embodiment 
of praxis - an individual or group’s ability to synthesize thought and action - in 
this case combining theory with nation building. By positioning himself as a self-
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described “cultural intermediary” between Bolivia and the West (Romero 2006) 
and interpreter of Bolivian history (Baker 2015), Linera attempts to legitimate 
and reify the MAS hegemony for both peasant-Indigenous and mestizo-white 
communities.  
According to historian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Bolivia’s population 
retains psychic historical traumas, both ancient colonial and the more recent 1952 
Revolution - where indigenous identities became sublimated to Marxian peasant 
class-based identities that linger in collective memory (Cusicanqui 1987). Linera 
uses these powerfully evocative collective memories of the emancipatory promise 
of reclaiming indigeneity as a symbolic currency for the contemporary MAS 
government to deploy as the self-proclaimed representative of revolutionary 
social movements. The most compelling examples of this are the use of 
symbolism in the strategic public spectacles of President Morales at various 
ceremonies. In his 2006 presidential inauguration Evo was blessed by an Andean 
priest after walking barefoot over coca leaves (Postero 2010). Postero goes on to 
state, “at his 2006 inauguration, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales claimed a 
lineage that included Andean indigenous insurrectional struggles, Simón 
Bolívar’s nationalism, and Che Guevara’s socialism” (2010:1). This pastiche 
array of dehistoricized martyrs are mediated through what Postero calls 
“indigenous nationalism” but could as easily be called hegemony. The MAS 
participates in a continuous conscious use of symbolism for strategic social 
movement objectives. To what degree this dominant discourse is sincere is a 
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challenging question, yet we can study the discourse of those in power and hold 
their actions up to a theoretical blueprint.  
In the preface to Plebeian Power, Pablo Stefanoni, director of the 
Bolivian Le Monde Diplomatique, describes Linera’s turn toward finding 
theoretical frameworks capable of galvanizing support for popular movements. 
Stefanoni writes, “in addition to Italian Antonio Negri, Garcia Linera took a 
‘sociological turn’ toward social movement theories and incorporated the 
historical sociology of Charles Tilly and the most rationalist visions of resource 
mobilization” (Linera 2014:8). Thus, in order to study the competing rationalities 
of the MAS on the one hand, and lowland NGO-indigenous groups on the other, 
it is worth using the critical theory approach known as immanent critique. With 
roots in the dialectical methods of Marx and Hegel, immanent critique employs, 
and provisionally accepts, an idea yet holds it up to a mirror of grounded material 
actions to test what gaps or contradictions exist between ideology and action. 
This technique is particularly important for questioning the core assertions of 
those in power based on the logic of the espoused ideology in a logical manner 
(Antonio 1981).  
Linera himself, a student of Gramsci and social movement theory, speaks 
of the tensions between purity and pragmatism as one moves from being a critic 
of the government to becoming part of it and discusses the role of hegemony in 
maintaining popular consent. He describes how, “Gramsci helps us to convert the 
decision of a few into a decision of many” (Linera 2015:7) and asserts that 
remaining pure and avoiding ethical compromises are impossible for those (like 
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himself) tasked with managing a government. However, Linera articulates that 
there remain emancipatory ways to transcend this contradiction asserting, “the 
Gramscian comprehensive state concept allows us to observe or leave this 
dilemma. If I put myself in the State I am a reformer, if I move away from the 
State, I am impotent and testimonial, which is a little (like) the dilemma between 
Marxists and anarchists, right?” (Linera 2015:8). In other words, we are asked to 
accept that a pragmatic, reformist posture where contradictions are inevitable is 
the best we can hope for in the inherently compromised position of those in 
power.  
Linera’s use of Gramsci’s comprehensive state is similar to the notion of 
integral state, roughly signifying the unification of civil society and political 
society (Nelson 2012). His statements about the nature of power help to frame a 
key debate between purity and pragmatism and how we are to understand 
development policies in Bolivia and across Latin American countries with 
continuing legacies of colonialism. The pragmatic approach views the Morales 
Administration as acting within the confines of a world system of global 
capitalism with few alternatives. A  macro-structural analysis that fits within 
DiMaggio and Powell’ iron cage of institutional isomorphism where the 
momentum of prior bureaucratic structures forces new regimes to comply with 
the internal logic of the existing system (1983). This assumes that state policy 
promotion of extraction is the most viable, or only, means of overcoming 
periphery status because alternatives no longer exist. This viewpoint also relies 
on structural explanations of the ways in which power is exercised - sublimating 
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the agency of individuals and groups to take control through mass movements 
that change policy. Arthur Mitzman’s The Iron Cage: An Historical 
Interpretation of Max Weber, asserts Weber’s pessimism was “only the truth of 
his epoch, his country, and his station, the truth of a bourgeois scholar in imperial 
Germany” (2017:1). Weber’s fatalism was certainly not shared by factory 
workers, peasants, and anarchists who did not have the luxury of pessimism. 
These groups chose instead to coordinate efforts that successfully expelled 
multinational corporations from privatizing the water supply of Bolivia’s third 
largest city in the ‘Cochabamba Water War’ of 2000 (Olivera 2004).  
A converse argument proposed by Jeffery Webber in, From Rebellion to 
Reform, is that despite the optics of the MAS being viewed as a homogeneous 
representation of the Left by many outside the country, the party was never an 
internally coherent radical bloc. Instead, Webber argued that as radical popular 
energy dissipated and ruptures in elite networks closed, the composition of the 
MAS party shifted from indigenous activism to a political structure more 
representative of, and beholden to, urban Mestizo middle class interests. Further, 
the party’s bifurcation of race from class issues effectively decoupled indigenous 
liberation goals from long term socialist objectives - representative of another 
dissonance within the party (Webber 2011). The cynical perspective taken by 
many indigenous-NGO coalitions is that the MAS party has simply perpetuated 
what Webber terms ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’ under a hegemonic progressive 
guise. I explore this question of what happened to the radical politics of the 
revolutionary period in greater detail in my final chapter.   
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2.4 Gramsci & the People Without History 
Before entering government, and while a member of the radical Tupac 
Katari Guerrilla Army, Linera remained unsatisfied with his synthesis of classical 
and Marxian thought to explain the Indian question and began to dig deeper into 
Marx’s historical documents on indigenous peoples - until he made a discovery 
from years of archival research on Marxian theory, that he believed would be an 
effective vehicle to foment popular movements in Latin America. He finally 
succeeded, after a decade long effort, to find a salient discourse of Marxist 
populism that would bind working class identities and diverse indigenous 
worldviews under a common roof (Linera 2014). The vice president describes his 
research process in his 2014 book, Plebeian Power: Collective Action and 
Indigenous, Working Class and Popular Identities in Bolivia: 
This was when my obsession with finding everything Marx had said about 
the (ethnic) issue began, and I did this for ten years. We started searching 
through Marx’s notebooks and texts on the ‘non-historic peoples’ from 
1848 and through the works of Engels … and then the ethnological 
manuscripts, and also the other, unpublished manuscripts in Amsterdam. 
We travelled there to look for a set of notebooks on Latin America; Marx 
had eight or 10 notebooks on Latin America. We became obsessed with 
finding a common thread on indigenous issues from a Marxist 
perspective, thinking that it was possible for Marxism to explain the 
significance of this issue, of the content and the potential of indigenous 
peoples’ ethno-national demands (Linera 2014:3). 
 
Once this powerful synthesis was unearthed, Linera was able to drive less 
salient labor struggles forward by combining Marx’s unpublished writings on the 
relationship between indigeneity and class solidarity in Latin America. As a 
theoretical accomplishment alone, this would have been significant. But by 
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integrating these insights into applied Gramscian political strategy - melding 
theory with praxis, Linera was able to form a potent popular hegemony, 
successfully aligning socialist Second World with indigenous Fourth World, to 
form a potent syncretism of worldviews that has lasted until today. Journalist 
Pablo Stefanini described the vice president’s intellectual journey as one where, 
“his interpretation of Marx, Lenin, Althusser, and Gramsci were useful in his 
challenge to the ‘old Left’ and for his search for a Marxism suited to the Andean 
reality” (Linera 2014:3). Importantly, this well construction indigenous popular 
hegemony cannot be attributed to Linera alone and was the product of 
collaborative efforts from other radical social movement leaders and organic 
intellectuals.  
Prior to his rise to power Linera cofounded the intellectual collective La 
Comuna, named after traditional Andean communities and the Paris Commune 
(McNelly 2017). Along with prominent Bolivian intellectuals Raúl Prada, Raquel 
Gutiérrez Aguilar, and Luis Tapia, members of La Comuna participated in the 
revolutionary period of 2000 - 2005 where left indigenous social movement 
coalitions destabilized two successive neoliberal regimes. Many of the vice 
president’s collaborators have since broken ranks and become some of the most 
outspoken critics of the MAS (Hylton & Thomson 2007, Webber 2015), while 
others were later placed in leading roles within the government (McNelly 2017). 
  
Within the early years after the MAS gained power, the construction of a 
left-indigenous syncretic hegemony took place within the deeply symbolic 
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crucible of cultural identity, classical labor struggle, and anti-imperialist 
sentiment. This pastiche image formed an effective cultural war of position 
against neoliberal and landed elite interests who were forced to cede ground. To 
foment this populist unity, Gramsci’s writings were consciously employed by 
Linera and other cultural architects in the Bolivian intelligentsia. 
The Vice President summarizes his role as an organic intellectual in 
building a popular hegemony by stating that, “there exists a social, political and 
moral leadership that allows for a sense of belonging and being represented 
within the State’s administrative structure, […] an alliance that unites the people 
around a common project” (Allen & Ouviña 2017). This common project, the 
MAS’ sustained ability to hold a popular hegemony, has reduced lowland social 
movement’s abilities to effectively mobilize against state actions by undermining 
their shared grievances from international and domestic communities that largely 
believe the rhetoric of the MAS. However, according to Peter Baker, a “point of 
bifurcation,” a rift in popular hegemony occurred in 2011 over the TIPNIS affair 
where police abused protesters (2015).  
The state’s decision to force the TIPNIS road was indicative of larger 
policy decisions, both overt and covert, to gain access to resources for extractivist 
interests. The crackdown has the impact of demoralizing and weakening the 
government’s political opposition by taking land away from lowland indigenous 
opponents and providing this territory, in a de facto sense, to cocalero colonists. 
Describing the government’s reaction to nonviolent protests, indigenous leader 
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and former vice-presidential candidate Marcial Fabricano recounts a 2017 
demonstration:  
We marched for days from Trinidad to Tarija to put pressure on the 
government to stop the development and exploitation in protected areas 
for defense of human rights and the environment. The government didn’t 
say anything, they just went ahead and drilled in the national parks 
(author’s recording).  
 
The state’s failure to acknowledge social movement claims that do not 
directly benefit those in power has increasingly become a hallmark of the 
government’s relations with civil society. In recent months, a group of disabled 
Bolivian activists called on the MAS to provide a basic $70 per month stipend for 
those with disabilities. When the activists neared the end of their long wheelchair 
march blocks from the main plaza, they were confronted with 400 police who 
used water cannons and pepper spray to stop protesters (The Guardian 5/5/2017). 
Although much of this piece is devoted to examinations of the state through a 
social movements lens, I do not want to underplay the importance of bravery 
within social movements. Douglas McAdam, the great historian of social 
movements, stresses that collective action is largely dependent upon the 
“courage, strategic skill, and knowledge of committed activists” (McAdam 
2010). Theories that frame social movement outcomes based on the agency of 
individuals to lever themselves against the powerful currents of the mainstream 
society lend an element of hope that the great movement of the world system can 
be shifted by a small but committed group of people. The individual bravery of 
Ghandi, Mandela, or Martin Luther King, although part of a larger movement, 
was able to bend the arc of history toward justice. Although these features are 
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rare in activists, the left does have no monopoly on bravery, or integrity and this 
feature can be found across the political spectrum, irrespective of the morality.  
 
2.5 Contradictions  
An important tension within the MAS’ hegemonic discourse is that the 
party’s socialist rhetoric is not always congruous with indigenous cosmovisions - 
with the intermittent emergence of profound discontinuities in the constructed 
ideology of the state through intellectual architects like Linera. David 
Choquehuanca, the MAS Minister of Foreign Affairs and an Andean cosmovision 
expert, describes how socialism, “seeks to satisfy the needs of man and for 
capitalism the most important thing is money and surplus value” (Economía 
Solidaria 2010). This indigenous critique of the exploitation inherent in 
capitalism - is also a criticism of the anthropocentrism of Bolivian socialism. This 
is instructive in recognizing that although Bolivia’s rich history of socialism 
remains part of the collective cultural identity of many traditions, there are 
distinct indigenous understandings of right livelihood that do not prioritize 
human nature over non-human nature and create symbolic tensions for 
indigenous communities. This bifurcation occurs at the state and local level in the 
syncretic traditions of indigeneity and peasant socialism. Two identities that, 
although amalgamated under the MAS, are not internally congruous.  
The rich history of struggle against oppressive governments within the 
lowlands remains active within collective memory. Many community members 
over 30 vividly remember the formative experiences of participating in 
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nonviolent marches to the capital under neoliberal regimes. The MAS’ 
contemporary violent repression of similar marches for indigenous lands, 
including for the protection of the TIPNIS, is a painful reminder for many 
lowland peoples that the struggle for full citizenship must continue (Baker 2015). 
Because of the short span of time that has lapsed, many of these social 
movements have retained their solidarity and institutional capacities via NGOs. 
Intergenerational movement do not easily fade - particularly when similar 
dynamics of extraction and contestation present themselves within recognizable 
patterns. Bienvenido Zacu, a Guarayo indigenous leader who held several key 
positions in the Morales government and played a prominent role in social 
movement activism leading to the new 2009 constitution discusses how today:  
The government refuses to investigate the land thefts (within the TCO). 
The colonists are ignorant, they are not interested in the law. The law says 
that you cannot enter the TCO and use the resources. But, the government 
built a road along the Piraie river, near Santa Cruz that helped colonists 
access more territory. This is just like the situation with the TIPNIS road 
(author’s interview).  
  
However, he goes on to discuss the next generation of indigenous leaders 
who continue the struggle against the colonists and others entering TCO 
Guarayo. These are counter-hegemonic narratives that are taking place 
throughout the lowlands and facilitated by NGOs. They are discussions that the 
MAS seeks to undermine by severing funding and creating parallel organizations 
- discussed in the first chapter. This state antagonism has generated a growing 
backlash throughout lowland Guarayo communities who are now deeply cynical 
about the MAS’ aims and largely reject the ecosocialist rhetoric of the 
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government. This rejection of dominant state narratives is often conducted 
symbolically through jokes and sarcasm as a way to express what lowland 
indigenous describe as the government’s ‘double discourse.’ For example, when 
indigenous rights are discussed formally by the state, lowland indigenous people 
use Orwell’s famous line from Animal Farm that, ‘all animals are equal, but some 
animals are more equal than others’ as a means of expressing their perceived 
dishonesty. The symbolism of Animal Farm is particularly salient given Orwell’s 
references to supposedly leftist governments reproducing systems of domination 
under the hegemonic framework of equality.  
 As Gramsci states, “wars of position (are) fought by huge masses who are 
only able to endure the immense muscular, nervous, and psychic strain with the 
aid of great reserves of moral strength. Only a skillful political leadership, 
capable of taking into account the deepest aspirations and feelings of those 
human masses, can prevent disintegration and defeat” (Gramsci 2008:88). 
Lowland indigenous peoples’ distrust of central authority is part of long standing 
battles against racial caste systems reified by landed elites. These left-indigenous 
coalitions first brought some redistribution of lands under the 1952 Agrarian 
Revolution and have since continued to build rural-urban alliances against 
consolidated power by recruiting those they view as potential allies, be they 
international NGOs or even to a limited extent right wing elites.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Indigenous peoples, particularly those living in Amazonian, became 
western icons synonymous with environmentalism through stereotypes including 
what Kent Redford’s termed the ecological noble savage, that blended indigenous 
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land sovereignty with environmental preservation (Redford 1990). This 
ecological Indian stereotype also carried what Pierre Bourdieu termed symbolic 
capital that carried particular significance for an international audience. This 
imagery was successfully leveraged by NGOs and fundraisers to build the 
sector’s large-scale conservation and human rights networks (Conklin and 
Graham 1995). Today, under the twilight of this symbolic imagery, both the 
MAS government and lowland peoples continue to employ a variety of these 
symbolic resources as mobilization strategies to control legitimacy and the 
dominant discourse.  
In the material world, irrespective of ideology, Bolivia has become the 
fastest growing economy in Latin America in recent years (Barría 2017). Despite 
the seeming end to Evo’s Bolivia after a national referendum in 2016, the 
country’s highest court recently overruled the constitutional mandate on 
presidential term limits - effectively allowing Morales to run for a fourth term in 
2019 and beyond (Blair 2017). The MAS party successfully argued that the first 
term of Evo’s presidency did not count because it was under the old constitution. 
Further, referencing the American Convention on Human Rights, the party 
argued that not allowing a person to run for president violates their “essential 
rights.” While critics of the government including Felipe Quispe, former leader of 
the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army who was once a supported the MAS called the 
state’s action, “capitalism with an Indian face” (The Economist. 12/1/2017).  
Both the Bolivian government and non-state actors draw from indigenous 
social movement backgrounds with both groups continuing to strategically 
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deploy stereotypes of indigeneity, ecological knowledge, and environmental 
preservation in their discourses to media and funding sources. The MAS attempts 
to undermine NGOs as the principal funding sources of their political opponents 
in various manners where the three general structures of resources are (1) social 
networks, (2) organizations, and (3) infrastructures (Edwards & Gillham 2013). 
In my first chapter, I outlined the ways in which the MAS targets indigenous 
grassroots social networks and organizations by facilitating the creation of 
parallel or ‘astro-turf’ leadership organizations at multiple scales of governance. 
While I refrain from delving into these points in this chapter, it is important to 
mention that the state strategically neglects indigenous social movement 
organization (SMO) infrastructure: including roads, waterways, and other 
necessary goods.  
While in the Chiquitania, former Mayor of Concepción Carlos Wasase 
mentioned that during his time in office, he dedicated funds toward road 
maintenance in TCO Monte Verde and throughout the community. Today, the 
roads are neglected and bridges in disrepair. According to numerous sources in 
the democratically elected NGO-indigenous alliances, the MAS-affiliated parallel 
organization in Monte Verde supports illegal logging and allowing drug 
traffickers to expand within the TCO. Fabricant and Postero argue that external 
market pressures for extractive and agricultural resources since colonial times 
remain the underlying drivers that pressure the Morales government into 
development projects such as the TIPNIS road and thus create tension with 
lowland actors (Fabricant and Postero 2015). Jeffery Webber challenges the 
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notion that the government has actually instituted substantive egalitarian reforms 
at any point in Morales’ presidency - instead arguing the MAS has simply 
incorporated indigenous-peasant movements into the state apparatus (2017). The 
MAS has also appropriated the indigenous sustainable development paradigm of 
vivir bien (living well) from the lowland Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del 
Oriente Boliviano CIDOB whose central role in creating the ideological 
architecture of the modern Bolivian plurinational state goes largely ignored 
(Beaulieu & Postero 2012).  
 
2.6 Civil Society Responses to State Hegemony  
Lowland indigenous social movements depend, to varying degrees, upon 
outside patronage for access to resources (Postero 2006). Over the last decade, 
this patronage of lowland indigenous organizing has been primarily from NGOs 
from Northern Europe and takes the form of assistance including viaticos (money 
for travel and living expenses), capacity building, event organizing, technical and 
legal assistance, research and publications on issues of general concern, platforms 
for institutional and cultural legitimation and the amplification of environmental 
and human rights grievances on the global stage (Postero 2006). Because there is 
a general absence of significant state support for indigenous civil society 
organizations at the local level, with high rates of unemployment in native 
communities, NGOs remain the backbone of institutional capacity building for 
many lowland native social movements, especially those critical of extractivism. 
According to indigenous leaders, lowland peoples are strategically ignored by the 
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state as a strategy to weaken criticism and punish dissent. Bienvenido Sacu, 
former Guarayo Congressman explains some of the constraints and the social and 
economic repercussions of state repression:  
One problem is we don’t have education for institutional capacity 
(building) specifically for healthcare. For example, my friend cut her foot, 
but there’s no specialist in the TCO, so she had to travel to Santa Cruz 
and it took a day. So, they had to cut off her foot. The new constitution 
says that the land is ours; for political participation, for natural resources. 
The forestry reserve law says the territory is ours. But this is a 
contradictory discourse about defending the territory...in order to sell 
artisanal crafts you need a certification … there are many rules. Why 
don’t we have that ability to certify in the lowlands? It’s only in the 
highlands where they certify and export. Since Evo was elected, the 
central government no longer allows communities to be compensated 
directly because of the assumption that they can’t be trusted. But instead, 
the government received money from extractive industries and gave it to 
the Indigenous Fund who then gave it to communities (author’s 
interview).  
The now defunct Indigenous Fund (2005 - 2015) was designed to provide 
money for rural development projects, yet the fund’s ten-year lifespan was mired 
in controversy. From inception, MAS affiliates were placed in leadership roles 
until the government was forced to dissolve the fund in 2015 amidst a corruption 
scandal that involved the embezzlement of approximately 7 million dollars 
destined for 49 uncompleted projects (CNN Espanol. 12/11/2015). The 
institutional structures of bureaucracy, complexity and corruption are one means 
the MAS uses to maintain indirect control over political rivals by enforcing a 
status quo of grinding poverty and economic dependency - by creating a colony, 
within a former colony. This government strategy effectively denies meaningful 
opportunities for indigenous TCO residents to pursue non-extractive livelihoods, 
instead giving power to transnational agribusiness giants including Cargill and 
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Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) to play managerial roles in the regional 
economies of the eastern lowlands. These vertically integrated corporate 
networks are the primary drivers of deforestation within the county and 
regionally (Burbach, 2008). When the MAS supports corporations over citizens, 
this facilitates the centralization of wealth in the right-wing Santa Cruz elite 
exacerbating maldistribution of lands. Deforestation and pollution effectively 
privatize remaining indigenous people’s lands and resources by making them 
toxic to consume and depressing the regenerative ecosystem processes through 
agro-industrial effluent.  
Further, similar problems of institutional capacity building are 
exacerbated by the government’s punitive use of bureaucracy as a strategy to 
prevent lowland indigenous peoples form participation in meaningful paid labor 
and non-extractive production in rural areas. This generates high rates of 
unemployment within TCOs and precipitates seasonal migrations of native 
workers to seek contingent precariat labor elsewhere. Even former Congressman 
Sacu remains underemployed, limiting trips to visit extended family in TCO 
Guarayo due to a lack of funds. Prior to his political career he worked as a 
carpenter. After his government service he now plays music with the Guarayo 
band Los Amigos at birthday parties, quinceañeras and other events to earn 
enough to feed their families - writing songs about environmental protection and 
territorial autonomy. Lowland indigenous movements are built on the backs of 
some of the most marginalized people in the country - and the government is 
fully aware of these conditions.  
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Recognizing these severe limitations to their political opponents, the 
MAS employs an economic scorched earth policy wherein funding towards 
native organizations not aligned with state interests are systematically 
undermined. Besides these wars of attrition already mentioned, the attacks arrive 
in the form of affronts to the character of movements and disparaging comments 
against leaders of native-allied NGOs (Moreiras 2015). On the one hand Vice 
President Linera criticizes western NGOs who support lowland indigenous 
capacity building as complicit in imperialism (Linera 2011). While organizations 
critical of the government draw their numbers from the ranks of intellectual 
discontents, former MAS loyalists, and lowland indigenous groups, under the 
common claim that the state is perpetuating an extractivist agenda with little 
improvement in living standards and scant distribution of resources to 
communities in need (Almaraz 2011). The political terrain of Bolivia is 
particularly complex because of the power of ideology to obscure the actual 
material conditions on the ground - with diverse parties employing legitimation 
strategies that make use of performance and symbolism.  
The radical project of transformative ecosocialist state formation 
continues to appeal to the international Left and Linera’s reputation as the 
country’s most important Marxist public intellectual theorist supports the 
framework. As Nancy Postero notes, the MAS has been able to consolidate 
political power through deploying a hegemonic discourse of indigenous 
nationalism that blends the indigenous insurrectionism of Tupac Katari, the 
nationalism of Simon Bolivar and the socialism of Che Guevara (2010). In a 
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recent piece, Postero further highlights the tensions between the MAS on the one 
hand promoting emancipatory politics by rewriting the constitution and 
performing symbolic acts of decoloniality to highlight racial injustice while at the 
same time promoting extractivism and enforcing state authority through police 
actions against civil society (Postero 2017).  
Due to the symbolic and ideological nature of Bolivian politics it is 
crucial to examine how material conditions, deforestation rates, relative poverty 
statistics, and other metrics may demonstrate better indicators of the condition of 
the poor under Morales. A recent report by Gonzalo Colque, Director of the well-
respected NGO Fundacion Tierra, states “in the last decade there has been a 
systematic expansion of agro-extractivism.” Colque called on the government to 
reform “development policies, especially in indigenous territories, to “adopt 
forms of use and exploitation of sustainable natural resources, instead of 
expanding the agribusiness model" (Fundacion Tierra 2017:1). According to a 
2016 United Nations Human Development Report based on consistent time series 
data, from the time the MAS was elected in 2005 - 2015, life expectancy 
increased from 63.5 to 68.7 years, GNI per capita increased from $4,549 to 
$6,155, (2011 PPP dollars), and the country’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
value rose from 0.625 to 0.674 (UN 2016).  
These development metrics are part of a  geopolitical, ideological and 
capitalist project of power relations that systematically neglect non-commodified 
resources until they are integrated into the market. To the extent that Bolivia, and 
other Latin American countries, participate in mainstream development practices 
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begun after the World War II, they are simply reifying the notion of poverty in a 
hegemonic manner based on reductive economic metrics. Political anthropologist 
Arturo Escobar, in his 1995 seminal work: Encountering Development: The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World, describes how the World Bank and 
the Truman Doctrine constructed the notion of poverty in particular economic 
ways - and in so doing two thirds of the world population became poor. In a 
Foucauldian sense, the social construction of poverty as a legitimation discourse 
reified neo-colonial relationships to the global south under the banner of 
development.  
In the 2012 reissue to his classic, Escobar considers the radical 
possibilities that Bolivia and Ecuador, as states with new constitutions that grant 
rights to nature, open genuine opportunities for noncapitalist practices to 
organically develop. He sees the crucible for these emancipatory possibilities 
originating in, “forms of autonomía that involve nonstate forms of power 
stemming from communal cultural, economic, and political practices” (Escobar 
2012 xxix). It is these types of democratic indigenous postdevelopment practices 
that the MAS government, with a political base rooted in cocalero mercantilism 
and an economic reliance on extractivism, seeks to undermine. Escobar 
characterizes the current dynamic as follows:  
In Ecuador and Bolivia in particular, postextractivism and 
postdevelomentalism thus bring together the state, NGOs, social 
movements, and intellectuals into a crucial and intense debate. There is a 
sense of an impasse created by the tense coexistence of progressive yet 
economistic and developmentalist policies at the level of the State, on the 
one hand, and the ability of movements to problematize such policies 
from below - a sort of “promiscuous mixture” of capitalist hegemony and 
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movement counterpowers, of radical demands for change and the 
reconstitution of ruling (Escobar 2012 xxx).  
 
It is this tension that makes the situation in Bolivia so important for 
studying alternatives to the modern social and ecological crises. An indigenous 
leader from the municipality of Gutierrez who participated in a march to block 
the TIPNIS road discussed his role vis-a-vis the government: “We are 
autonomous (but) the government is not interested in helping the process of 
autonomy. We don’t have economic resources to strengthen the autonomy 
process. The lowland indigenous must know that the government is a necessary 
part of this process, but the advancement is very slow.” As Jeffrey Webber points 
out, although a radical rhetoric of change continues to be deployed the MAS 
government never acted on these revolutionary reforms. He argues that:  
Despite its impressive capacity to mobilize and its far-reaching anti-
capitalist and indigenous-liberationist objectives, however, the left-
indigenous bloc lacked a revolutionary party that might have provided the 
leadership, strategy and ideological coherence necessary to overthrow the 
existing capitalist state and rebuild a new sovereign power rooted in the 
self-governance of the overwhelmingly indigenous proletarian and 
peasant majority (2012:150).  
 
The power of ideology and the Evo’s strategic use of symbolism to 
convey meaning both domestically and internationally. Choosing to be sworn in 
as president at a pre-Incan site near La Paz by an indigenous religious leader. His 
speech was an homage to Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar, the Incan leader Tupac 
Katari, and quoted the Mexican Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos (Postero 
2010). When asked in an interview about how his perspective changed after 
assuming the role of Vice President, Linera replied:  
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Being in the government has mostly reaffirmed the things that I believed 
and argued long before I ever imagined that I would participate directly in 
the state. In particular, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the state’s monopoly 
on symbolic power has had increasing resonance, helping me understand 
how the state functions (Farthing 2010:31).  
  
This is instructive given the strategic use of symbolic power the MAS 
continues to wield. Indigeneity, nationalism, and anti-imperialist imagery are 
useful ideological tools for state institutions seeking to hegemonically legitimate 
extractivism. Under a postmodern pastiche imagery integrating elements of 
famous figures and reconfiguring their diverse and highly archetypal elements to 
support nation building.  
Since the election of Evo in 2005, the international press on the political 
Left has shown massive support for the president, quoting his ecological socialist 
discourse and providing an effective shield against those discontents. Such is the 
power of identity politics, to decouple ideology from material conditions while 
worshiping discourses deployed by those in power. This is a phenomenon that 
continues to this day with Linera’s assertion that 50 - 100 years of extractivism is 
a prerequisite to a socialist society of the future. Even today, as political fractures 
have grown in the country, and international and domestic press has been largely 
critical of the TIPNIS road, within academic circles, there continues to be debates 
between those supportive of the long-term vision of the MAS and the ecological 
and human rights compromises that must be made for a decolonial project. While 
some critics claim that Morales has largely sold out to capital interests and 
maintained control through invoking the ecological Indian stereotype as diversion 
to capture the imaginations of unreflexively progressive ideologies.  
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This dynamic of symbolic, dematerialized rhetorical struggles 
superseding the needs and material conditions of people. As Cornel West argues, 
moral action is based on “systematic social analysis of the circumstances under 
which tragic persons struggle” (Gilyard 21). In other words, in order to 
understand what is happening in a given situation, a carefully examination must 
be undertaken to study the material conditions and lived experiences of those 
people and groups resisting the general directions of society. Antonio Gramsci 
termed political party’s efforts to assert hegemonic legitimacy through wars of 
position wherein popular hegemony is maintained through a political party’s 
reification of a dominant ideological framework disseminated via media, 
education, or other socializing apparatus (Egan 2014). Once established, these 
hegemonic frames allow the party to carry out their real objectives outside of the 
veil of ideology. In the Bolivian case, the MAS deploys eco-socialist discourses 
to the international media, easing concern from foreign civil society groups who 
themselves are institutionally designed to fight overt human and environmental 
threats. Once popular hegemony is established the MAS is free to continue plans 
for extractive projects that violate international laws relating to indigenous 
people’s right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). If there is push back 
from marginalized groups, the state either ignores, cracks down, or claims NGO 
foreign interventionism using salient anti-imperialist rhetoric designed to inspire 
feelings of nationalism against the very real threats of US imperial hemispheric 
policies characteristic of the Monroe Doctrine.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
Progressive laws have gone hand in hand with environmental extractivism 
in Bolivia, Ecuador, and across Latin America since before the MAS. However, 
the massive economic restructuring that occurred in Bolivia in the 1980s and 
elsewhere deeply privatized public services in what Naomi Klein considers as 
one of the most brutal ‘shocks’ of any country in the Southern Cone. According 
to Latin American economics Professor Ricardo Grinspun, Bolivia’s economy 
received the “orthodox approach” developed at the neoliberal Chicago School of 
economics to, “shift all the social cost onto the poor through shock therapy” 
(Klein 2007:149). Instead of the population going limp and accepting the 
bombardment of devastating cuts to social programs, as conservative economists 
had hoped for, the poorest people organized, toppled the neoliberal governments 
and brought Morales and the MAS to power. Yet despite the partial 
nationalization of extractive industries under the MAS, with noteworthy rebounds 
in civil society over the last 12 years, there are material infrastructure and social 
services that cannot be rebuilt overnight.  
This is particularly true given the structural conditions of the world 
system and the ability of international financial institutions to punish nations that 
do not comply with neoliberal orthodoxy. These continuous defeats prompted the 
famous writer Eduardo Galeano to describe Latin American countries as 
“specialized in losing” (1997:1) Because of this, many Latin American politicians 
have taken a short-term approach toward their political goals, many only looking 
as far as the next election cycle. Yet, in Bolivia, the general public disapproval 
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towards Morales, without any viable alternative candidates, is a crisis for the left 
allowing rightist conservative factions to regroup, seek allies, and employ the 
salient rhetoric of autonomy and sovereignty as a right-wing populist Trojan 
horse for rebuilding landed aristocratic fortunes based on expropriation of public 
lands via agribusiness and other extractive models. Why are indigenous territories 
continuing to struggle under Morales? The idea of indigenous territories (TCOs) 
was developed under neoliberal regimes with the help of NGOs who believed 
that indigenous communities were the common denominator for native peoples. 
However, as long-time wildlife biologist and anthropologist, Wendy Townsend 
notes:  
The idea of TCOs was an outside vision to make communities into 
territories that are communally managed. Indigenous peoples are really 
more concerned with their families as the main denominator, not the 
village.  
 
Townsend describes rival parallel indigenous groups as result of existing 
ideological differences within the community. TCOs, as semi-autonomous 
spaces, do not necessarily function homogeneously and where fragile, emerging 
democratic institutions are perhaps more vulnerable to extractivist interests due to 
economic impoverishment. Further, the power of global capital to influence 
modern state building efforts in Pink Tide countries where colonial forms of 
extraction remain the dominant productive form irrespective of who is in power 
or what the discursive rhetoric employed. As such, TCOs with all their natural 
wealth, are a nexus where the MAS’ popular hegemony meet the remaining legal 
protections put in place by NGO-indigenous coalitions. Both sides remain locked 
in a battle over the soul of the country. Productive opportunities for synthesis of 
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development policies remain. Just and sustainable communities depend on 
inclusive dialogue among groups. Linera’s position is that short term ecological 
damage is necessary for long term socialist goals. While critics argue this is a 
Faustian bargain where human and ecological rights are to be sacrificed for the 
prospect of an ecosocialist future. This would be closer to Gramsci’s reading of 
Machiavelli's The Prince, where the needs of the political party are apart from a 
material framework.  
Is the framing of pragmatism versus purity an overly simplistic 
dichotomy? Can the country meet future energy needs by rapidly developing 
infrastructure through redistributed hydrocarbon rents? Where would the money 
for infrastructure development come from if royalties from extraction cease? 
Could regional alliances be capable of producing the kinds of goods, medicines, 
and technologies capable of allowing everyone to meet their basic needs and 
participate as full citizens in a modern world of their choosing? I explore these 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
PURITY OR PRAGMATISM? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
BOLIVIA IN THE WORLD SYSTEM 
 
   Given the structural constraints of the contemporary world system and the 
historical momentum of core-periphery relationships to production and 
extraction, I ask: why is the Bolivian government simultaneously accelerating 
extractivism while promoting constitutional reforms for indigenous territories and 
the rights of nature? I examine the 2006 – 2018 period under President Evo 
Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) political party. I use immanent 
critique to interrogate the degree to which the state’s concrete actions coincide 
with, or diverge from, the party’s political speech to highlight possible 
contradictions - while recognizing the government’s actions take place within a 
larger geopolitical system dominated by global capital. 
Why would the MAS accelerate extraction while simultaneously 
supporting certain rights for indigenous peoples and the environment? 
Geographer David Harvey poses a similar question when he asks if these 
contradictions and the reformist character of the MAS is due to, “a matter of 
political choice, expediency, or a necessity imposed by the configuration of class 
forces prevailing in Bolivia, backed by strong external imperialist pressures” 
(2013:143). Are the contradictions in state development policies a result of 
structural constraints within a global world system that denies meaningful 
alternatives or a fundamental betrayal of indigenous-Left social movement efforts 
for postcolonial alternative livelihoods? What concrete actions has the MAS 
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taken to meaningfully alleviate poverty, protect natural areas and restructure the 
economy for sustainable human development? Finally, what exit strategies exist 
for lowland indigenous peoples in their struggle for place-based self-
determination? How can we reconcile policies and processes that both support 
and undermine lowland indigenous peoples made by the first indigenous 
president in the Americas in 500 years?  
While we cannot make conclusive assertions about the internal reasons 
for the state’s decisions to shift from revolution to reform, we can make empirical 
observations about the condition and distribution of land and the relative welfare 
of some of the most marginalized groups within the country -  rural indigenous 
populations. I base my analysis on fieldwork conducted in the Bolivian lowlands, 
archival data and national level poverty metrics from governmental and 
nongovernmental sources on indicators including: mortality rates, literacy rates, 
life expectancy and other country level data to analyze the degree to which partial 
nationalization of hydrocarbon rents under the MAS has impacted rural 
indigenous peoples of the lowlands. Before beginning the analysis, I historicize 
and contextualize Bolivia’s relationship to the world system.  
 
3. Literature Review  
Immanuel Wallerstein is generally viewed as having devised the most 
popular version of world systems theory as a meta-analysis for understanding 
social reality. Wallerstein traces the roots of the world system to the 16th century 
agricultural arena when global capitalism became the dominant economic system 
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(Wallerstein 2004). In the updated version, world systems analysis argues that a 
global division of labor exists based on the three categories of power relations 
termed core-states, periphery, and semi-periphery areas (Wallerstein 2011). 
Core-states are those with robust organs of governance, high degrees of economic 
complexity, and ‘cultural integrity’ while periphery-states occupy a weakened 
colonial, or neo-colonial position with relatively low levels of autonomy. Semi-
periphery and periphery are termed areas rather than states to connote weakened 
mechanisms of state governance. Semi-periphery areas lie somewhere in between 
either category and may have occupied the prior role of core states or developed 
in such a way as to transcend aspects of their former peripheral area status 
(Wallerstein 1976). Similar in many respects to World Systems Theory, 
Dependency theory uses core-periphery relationship between countries but 
focuses on differential power relations between core and periphery as the main 
explanatory factory for global inequality.  
Dependency theory was first developed by economist Hans Singer in his 
1949 article, “Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries” and elaborated 
by Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch beginning in 1950 with his publication, 
“The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems” 
(Prebisch 1950). The synthesis of these economist’s works formed the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis (Bloch and Sapsford 2000). Decency theory identifies global 
inequality as a function of unequal exchange - where periphery nations export 
relatively lower priced primary commodities (including food, minerals, or oil) 
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the production of manufactured goods (including phones, cars, or computers) and 
generally command a higher price relative to primary commodities. According to 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, over the longue durée, Bolivia and any country 
that continues exporting primary commodities will remains in a periphery status 
of unequal exchange leading to underdevelopment. Contemporary Bolivia fits 
well into this model. According to recent World Bank data, the country’s five 
primary export commodities are: natural gas, zinc, gold, silver, and soy beans. 
While the country’s greatest imports are manufactured goods including: 
processed petroleum, diesel vehicles, machines, mechanical appliances, metal 
bars and rods, and gas-powered trucks (World Bank 2015).  
More recent tests of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis support the thesis that 
primary commodity prices tend to devalue over time relative to manufactured 
goods, suggesting the model remains valid under modern global market 
conditions with recent studies from scholars including; Harvey, Kellard, Madsen, 
and Wohar, 2010; Singer 1998; Arezki,  Hadri, Loungani, and Rao, 2014.   
 
3.1 Post-Shock Bolivian Reconstruction 
There was a great push for democratic reforms across Latin American 
nations in the 1980s as a direct response to the neoliberal shocks that drastically 
privatized state services and plundered the public sphere. Although the Bolivian 
people narrowly elected Victor Paz Estenssoro President in 1985 on a platform of 
nationalizing industries and moving the country away from two decades of 
dictatorship - Paz did not deliver on his promises. According to Naomi Klein in 
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her classic 2004 book, The Shock Doctrine, Paz inherited a national economy in 
ruins from corruption, kleptocracy and experiencing massive inflation. Harvard 
economist Jeffrey Sachs was brought in as economic advisor to stabilize the 
economy. Although trained as a demand side Keynesian economist, Sachs instead 
decided to recommend one of the most extreme “shock therapy” approaches yet 
attempted in efforts to restructure the economy based on Milton Friedman’s 
Chicago School. The neoliberal turn meant that currency inflation would be 
addressed by a series of draconian budget cuts, price deregulations, and massive 
privatization measures to dismantle, “the entire state-centric model” - all in less 
than 100 days (Klein 2004:146). This secret economic bomb was detonated on 
the unsuspecting Bolivian population who were awaiting democratic reforms. 
The public reaction to this betrayal of democracy was not ‘shock and awe’ - but 
rather outrage and rebellion - with union leaders calling for a general strike and 
huge social movement mobilizations in the streets.  
One state strategy Paz employed to scare the population into submission 
was to deploy the military who rounded up approximately one hundred labor 
leaders and flew them to a secret prison in the northeast. This kidnapping and 
economic blackmail was designed to pressure labor to end the strike - and the 
tactic was successful. Mass mobilizing stalled and the public succumbed to what 
Latin American economics professor Ricardo Grinspun called an, “orthodox 
approach to shift all the social cost onto the poor through shock therapy” (Klein 
2004:146).  
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Within two years, the unemployment rate increased from 20% percent at 
the time of election to 30%. The state’s tin mines were among the sectors of the 
economy hardest hit, with more than 75% of miners laid off and forced to move 
to city slums or to the intermountain slope of the Chapere region to grow coca. 
Evo Morales came from one of these miner-turned-cocalero communities who 
clearly remembered the betrayal of labor, Washington Consensus imposed shock 
treatments, US coca crackdowns, and neoliberal policies that destroyed the 
country’s efforts for meaningful democracy and ushered in another wave of 
governance that maintained one of the worst levels of land and wealth inequality 
in Latin America. Unsurprisingly, in the year 2000, the Cochabamba ‘Water 
War’ where a subsidiary of San Francisco based Bechtel corporation was 
expelled from the country after attempting predatory rate increases in Bolivia’s 
third largest city where two-thirds of residents, “earn less than the cost of their 
minimum required daily nutrition” (Davis 2017:25). With the election of Evo in 
2005, hopes were high for correcting the failures of the 1952 Agrarian Reforms 
to substantively address both issues of maldistribution and the vicious legacy of 
white supremacy that had maintained class relations within a racialized hierarchy 
for centuries.  
 
3.2 For the MAS or the Masses? 
At present, the official poverty rates show significant improvement on the 
national level with extreme poverty rates falling from 38% to 18.8% between 
2005 - 2013, and moderate poverty falling from 60% to 39% in the same 
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timeframe (Postero 2017). Recent World Health Organization (WHO) statistics 
from 2015 show the country’s mortality rates for children under 5 and maternal 
mortality rates have more than halved from 1990 levels (WHO). A 2016 United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report indicated that between 2005 - 
2010, those in extreme poverty went from 38% to 25%, while moderate poverty 
declined from 60% to under half the population (49.6%) (UNDP 2016). 
Immunization rates for 1-year old children in the same time period (1990 - 2015) 
more than doubled (40% - 85%) while national expenditures on health care have 
risen only slightly (WHO 2015). A study assessing child health in Bolivia from 
2003 to 2008 similarly found immunization rates increased, while more complex 
public health problems, including infant mortality and malnutrition, remained at 
similar levels in the first years of Morales’ presidency (Heaton, Crookston, 
Forste, and Knowlton, 2014).       
Other country level metrics indicate improvements. The unemployment 
rate more than halved in the same time period - from 8.4% to 4% (Human 
Development Report 2016) and according to a piece in The Guardian, Bolivia 
leads all other Latin American countries in transferring a larger share of Gross 
National Product (GNP) to the poor through social welfare programs including 
the Juancito Pinto school voucher program and the Renta Dignidad retirement 
pension for those 60 years old or older (Navarro 2012). Although Morales claims 
that the Juancito Pinto program reduced school dropout rates from 6% - 2%, 
there are difficulties in assessing these efficacy claims because these programs 
lack longitudinal data as there was no prior baseline for comparison (McGuire 
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2013). The majority of the Bolivian population (68.5%) is urban with little 
change since 2005 (UNDP 2016). Recent World Bank estimates place the rural 
population at approximately 31% (2016). With few paved roads outside major 
cities and widening political junctures, there is great disparity between rural and 
urban populations in community access to healthcare, sanitation, education and 
other basic services. While clean water, basic sanitation and electricity have been 
provided by the state to many rural indigenous communities, NGOs continue to 
fulfill vital roles including; healthcare, capacity building, microfinance and small 
business support, and a host of other tasks. For many isolated communities, and 
within underserved cities and towns, the erosion of NGO funding under Morales 
has resulted in few meaningful changes in overall welfare. However, there is 
overall a dearth of reliable data on longitudinal health metrics in rural areas 
making definitive statements difficult. 
 
3.3 Sincere Political Economic Approaches   
Speaking about the region, Leandro Vergara and Camus Cristóbal Kay 
assert that although leftist Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, have not lived up to the promises of agrarian land reform and 
divestment from the business-as-usual neoliberal model - there have been a few 
differences. According to the authors, TCOs in Bolivia and communal lands in 
Ecuador, represent a possible break from the general centralization and 
privatization of lands because these territories are integrated into the constitutions 
of both countries. However, citing Bebbington and Bebbington, the authors assert 
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that in actual practice, indigenous land sovereignty, “is very limited and they 
have not impeded left-wing governments from encroaching on those territories 
when the extractive imperative requires it” (Vergara and Kay 2017). These 
findings are consistent with the author’s fieldwork where de facto processes of 
autonomy are often overlooked by both state and nonstate actors. Yet these 
criticisms of the state are vigorously contested by Morales’ supporters - 
principally Evo’s Vice President Álvaro Marcelo García Linera.  
Beaulieu and Postero note that Linera’s trilogy of books, The Creative 
Tensions of the Revolution (2010), “NGOism,” Infantile Illness of the Right 
(2011), and Geopolitics of the Amazon (2012) all attempt to rebuke MAS critics 
as ultimately benefiting the power structures of right wing elites and the system 
of global capital. The authors summarize Linera’s Geopolitics, a work directed at 
undermining the central arguments of the entire lowland indigenous peoples 
represented by CIDOB (the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia) that 
critiques efforts to protect the TIPNIS by NGO-indigenous alliances. The vice 
president characterizes efforts to protect the TCO and park as a: 
Hysterical dramatization … (that) is actually a strategy of colonial 
domination that takes advantage of the internal contradiction at the heart 
of the revolutionary popular bloc that brought Morales to power (Beaulieu 
& Postero 2012:14). 
 
Linera asserts that power in the Amazon is held by three principal groups 
broken into (1) regional landed elites, (2) transnational corporations from the 
global north and (3) NGOs. He concludes that lowland indigenous people’s 
efforts to protect the TIPNIS and maintain TCO sovereignty should be 
understood as a colonial neo-hacienda system where indigenous people’s 
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organizing against the MAS will have the long-term impact of taking away their 
own collective rights and serving the political economic interests of outsiders 
(Beaulieu & Postero 2012).  
Linera’s argument - synthesized by anthropologist Nancy Postero who 
works with lowland Guaraní - is that the state occupies the only legitimate 
position to protect indigenous lands. TCO residents are, according to Linera, 
controlled in a patriarchal fashion by various non-state actors, principally NGOs, 
that detract from government power and foster elite-driven capital accumulation 
by detracting from national protectionism. Linera’s narrative neglects to 
recognize the agency of lowland indigenous peoples to make conscious and 
pragmatic decisions, not to mention their significant contribution to state building 
- and their role in asserting the guiding principle of sustainability under the term, 
“vivir bien” (living well) in the new 2009 constitution (Schavelzon 2012). 
Similarly, Linera’s perspective fails to honor decades-long lowland social 
movement efforts for regional autonomy prior to the MAS. However, the struggle 
between the government vis-a-vis indigenous-NGO coalitions is, as described in 
the previous chapter, not simply a battle over real estate, but a war for popular 
hegemony and the creation of a common-sense narrative for the past and future of 
the nation.  
Within a global context, Rosaleen Howard frames how, “the bid for 
hegemony of Morales and the MAS-affiliated bloc threatens to disrupt the 
language/knowledge/power paradigm that has hitherto helped define relations of 
power” (2010:15). Federico Fuentes in, “Bad Left Government” versus “Good 
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Left Social Movements”? A Critique of Jeffrey Webber’s Arguments Against the 
MAS as a Party of ‘Reconstituted Neoliberalism,’” argues that casting cocaleros 
and miners as essentially opposed to one another reifies inter-Left conflicts and 
undermines commonalities that would benefit all leftist groups via coalitions 
around larger structural goals of overcoming imperialism through international 
socialism (Ellner 2014). A similar argument could be made between MAS 
loyalists and lowland indigenous autonomist communities, where both could 
benefit from greater levels of collaboration. Fuentes’ anti-Manichean argument 
frames the challenges Bolivia faces as irreducible to issues of “imperialist 
meddling” but rather as historically situated processes of colonialism and 
imperialism, that entrenched the nation into a dependent raw materials exporter 
within the world economy (Ellner 2014:120). Under this sincere perspective, the 
MAS party is given leeway for their broken promises due to external market 
pressures.  
Historical and contemporary economic boom to bust cycles have only 
centralized these path dependencies. Brent Kaup argues that after the 2008 
financial crisis, financial institutions were bailed out by depleting public 
resources. Global Northern countries, including the US, UK, and Spain, imposed 
domestic austerity policies that resembled the structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) imposed on the Global South after the Post World War II period. Yet, 
despite massive increases in wealth inequality and the admonishment from 
mainstream economists, including Alan Greenspan, that there were problems 
with the ‘free market’ ideology, the economic fixes to the system remain largely 
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unchanged in their relationship to the promotion of capital accumulation and 
wealth inequality. Kaup, quoting Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, calls this 
continuation of neoliberalism a “zombie phase” animated by technocratic forms 
of muscle memory, deep instincts of self-preservation, and spasmodic bursts of 
social violence (2012:17).  
This zombie neoliberalism, or put differently, the institutional isomorphic 
pressures described by DiMaggio and Powell, exert tremendous pressures on the 
MAS or any other democratically elected party in power. Combined with a 
deeply rutted political terrain of path dependencies force Morales and other Pink 
Tide leaders - not to mention Greece’s Syriza, Spain’s dynamic Podemos Party, 
or other more independent political forces - forced to confront a capitalist edifice 
that cannot easily be rebuilt under different architectural principles. How then can 
the great desires of the demos reconstruct the foundations of a public sphere 
systematically abandoned and looted for decades? These would be a great 
challenge for a wealthy nation such as the U.S. where the legacy of wealth 
inequality and white supremacy remain 150 years after black reconstruction. The 
slums of Philadelphia today continue to be some of the poorest in the U.S. over a 
century after Du Bois’ wrote his classic, The Philadelphia Negro. So, for a single 
vulnerable economy in one of the poorest countries in Latin America to 
accomplish this feat would be an almost Sisyphean task indeed. Even to have a 
functioning regional alliance such as ALBA - the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America composed of 11 Latin American states - to function 
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under an entirely different set of rules outside the world system is a great 
challenge that cannot be expected in a short period of time.  
After centuries of colonial exploitation under core-periphery relations as 
well as decades of privatization, erosion of the public sphere under militarism, 
dictatorships, dirty wars, plutocracy, neoliberalism, and structural adjustment, 
this is a monumental task. Yet the ghosts of Che, Simon, Fidel and many named 
and unnamed revolutionaries linger in the collective memory of Latin American 
social movements who maintain the struggle for substantive democracy as a verb 
- not a noun. And this light is perhaps brightest for those in the lowlands who 
have been systematically denied equity for 500 years. The main questions remain, 
will the heterodox lowland movements, with their diverse needs and aspirations, 
be able to form coalitions capable of bringing pressure to bear on those in power? 
Will NGOs, so central to indigenous capacity building, be capable of maintaining 
these coalitions under an entirely different political landscape in some ways more 
complex than before? 
 
3.4 Cynical Analysis     
 The MAS is reformist at best and “reconstituted neoliberalism” at worst 
argues Marxist scholar Jeffery Webber. The actual standard of living has not been 
significantly altered under Evo and instead the revolutionary character of the 
party that peasant and indigenous social movements fought for is best 
characterized as reformist political opportunism that leaves in place hierarchical 
class relations where transnational corporations and regional elites are prioritized 
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over the welfare of the most vulnerable (Webber 2011). In the final chapter of his 
2013 work, Rebel Cities, David Harvey sees Bolivia’s social movement struggles 
in the radical 2000 - 2005 period as at the forefront of the global efforts to repulse 
neoliberal globalization. Harvey asks why Bolivia, and leftist governments across 
Latin America, “were controlled and reabsorbed into dominant capitalist 
practices” (119:2013). Why did Bolivian social movement efforts to radically 
reclaim democracy and public goods fundamentally fail to maintain their core 
goals - concerning nationalization of resources, as well as rights for people and 
the planet? Why is today’s MAS party a milquetoast administration that recently 
succeeded in overriding presidential term limits in the new constitution and now 
stands with Nicaragua as the only states in the Americas with no limits on 
presidential re-election (Blair 2017).  
Harvey’s engages with Webber’s critique of the MAS and concludes that 
the party moved towards reform based on world systems pressures, similar to my 
analysis in the second chapter of this work. Harvey reminds us that calls for 
autonomy in Latin America are often associated with leftist progressive 
movements. Arturo Escobar is similarly supportive of these movements as, at 
base, anti-capitalist. Yet within the Bolivian context, lowland elites continue to 
use similar platforms of autonomy against the state (2013). This partially explains 
the uneasy and often pragmatic alliances between lowland indigenous and Santa 
Cruz elites where calls for autonomy serve both group’s interests even if the 
underlying relations - to both land use and political-economic power - are clearly 
oppositional in the long term. Harvey, despite admitting his ignorance of the 
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situational complexities, remains skeptical of the underlying reasons for 
autonomist efforts from the lowlands - whether they originate from indigenous 
communities or right-wing elites. So we need to be clear about examining power 
relations and the underlying reasons for group’s efforts to gain autonomy at 
various scales.  
Even within indigenous communities, the struggle for territorial autonomy 
is largely an ideological tension between place-based use-values and exchange-
values. This dichotomy can partially explain some of the reasons for the 
emergence of parallel indigenous leadership organizations. With the more recent 
splinter parallel groups representing a more mercantile, exchange-value centered 
worldview emphasizing short term wealth accumulation via legitimating logging 
and other forms of extraction in TCOs - over the cultural survival and 
independent sustainable human development. Under the current paradigm, rural 
to urban pressures are likely to exacerbate this pressure to prioritize resource 
commodification.  
 
3.5 Indigenous-NGO Alliances  
NGOs play an historical and contemporary relationship within this world 
system. In the Post World War II era, the third sector fills the gaps left by 
neoliberal austerity and marketization. After the deconstructed administrative 
state no longer fulfills basic social services and instead exists to perform limited 
functions for serving capital interests - civil society begins to unravel. This 
presents a significant problem for the workings of the system primarily for the 
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great mass of the poor who have no real possibilities for obtaining a better life, 
but also for elites in a somewhat limited capacity. A neo-Dickensian world is of 
course desirable for the masters of mankind - as a disposable army of labor, wage 
suppressant and provider of various services inherent to desperate peoples. Yet 
philanthropy and the heterodox reasons for NGOs remains strong and fulfill 
significant roles of concern to elites and others in relatively privileged strata. 
Even early on, the collective need to address basic sanitation, promote 
immunizations, etc. was recognized as inherently important by elites in order to 
prevent disease outbreaks and other causes of general concern. NGOs can thus be 
used as ad hoc subcontractors rather than providing full time state employment 
by fulfilling development needs generally fulfilled by the state, these 
organizations can depoliticize citizens by encouraging the public to look to the 
third sector rather than the state for solutions. This implicitly encourages anti-
statist stances in the public conscious that do support an eroded public sphere 
under neoliberalism. In so doing, NGOs may have a deleterious impact on the 
structures of democratic institutions - further legitimating the privatization of the 
public sphere. By imposing unelected - and therefore non-democratic 
management to address issues of public concern, groups can co-opt organic 
intellectuals and the relatively privileged classes into working for NGOs through 
the economic whip and lack of public alternatives. Additionally, nonprofits may 
reinforce economic dependencies, function at sub-national levels, and be subject 
to the external whims of outside global northern donors with limited local 
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knowledge and a host of other concerns relevant to considering the tensions 
between state, civil society, and global capital (Petras, 1997).  
In essence, Linera’s critiques of the nonprofit sector are structurally 
sound, yet strategically ignores the agency of lowland communities to reject state 
sponsored extractivism and argue for sovereignty and for the rule of law set forth 
in the new constitution. In August 2017, Morales accused, “some NGOs and 
foundations” of being “instruments of the empire to loot and intervene [in] 
countries” (Human Rights Watch 2018). The MAS is willing to promote 
propaganda that uses nationalism and fear of an external enemy to discredit 
democratic lowland indigenous grievances and allies. Yet, the state has been, as 




 Clear political economic constraints for an independent Bolivia remain 
part of a colonial path dependent world system far beyond the scale of the MAS 
political party at the national level. NGOs, primarily functioning at the meso or 
local levels, are ill equipped to recognize these macro-economic pressures. While 
each group of actors (the MAS party, NGOs, and indigenous communities) can 
each be viewed, in the words of Joseph Campbell, as the ‘hero in their own story’ 
it is important to examine the material conditions of the most marginalized as a 
bellwether of the condition of the society as a whole. There is certainly a greater 
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burden of responsibility placed on the state to provide for the most vulnerable, 
given the state’s role to preserve the public trust.  
Bolivia’s forest dependent indigenous communities of the eastern 
lowlands, peoples whose labor has been devalued, made redundant from 
neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s, and whose land has become the last frontier 
of monopoly agrarian capital - lie at the front lines of this fight. The skeletal de 
jure protections for indigenous territories must be reinforced. Indigenous 
communities must be provided with transparent processes of free, prior, and 
informed consent (FPIC) within open legislative processes that allow deliberative 
dialogue. Despite constraints, the MAS, or any government beholden to 
principles of democratic accountability, must be assessed based on a transparent 
examination of the conditions of human rights and the contradictions between 
rhetoric and concrete practices. With greenlighting the TIPNIS road, threatening 
NGOs, and failing to prosecute state offenders for past human rights violations, 
are serious threats to the integrity of the nation (Human Rights Watch 2018).  
What possible alternative livelihoods exist for the lowland indigenous 
communities in TCOs including the Guarayo, Chiquitano, Guarani, and others, in 
determining their unique destinies and moving beyond the confines of extractive 
paradigms from the colonial period to the present? What emerging opportunities 
exist for Bolivia as the U.S. Monroe Doctrine recedes as the tide of empire is 
eclipsed by Chinese, Russian, and other ascendant powers? Will the new global 
hegemon perpetuate the same global resource extraction under a recognizable 
core-periphery relationship - as the evidence of extractivism in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
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and Peru suggests? Or will there be a power vacuum as the U.S. falls from the 
world’s stage and allowed greater independence for Latin American countries to 
determine their own destinies. Elite divisions in world powers, particularly under 
the Trump administration, are creating possibilities for the formation and 
shuffling of alliances across the political spectrum.  
The conventional framing of the Morales administration vis-a-vis lowland 
indigenous peoples, is seen as a power struggle between the government and 
lowland TCO sovereignty. NGOs loyal to indigenous peoples argue for increased 
rights and autonomy through the completion of TCO titling and greater state 
resources directed to local communities. While MAS loyalists, the agricultural 
and livestock sectors seek reduced indigenous rights to TCOs under a more 
aggressive extractivist model with the most well discussed icon for this 
discussion the TIPNIS road project. While these are important questions, there is 
a third option. Do nothing. As in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the two main 
solutions presented are either to create a two-state solution or integrate 
Palestinians and Arab Israelis into the Jewish state and allow them to fight for 
equal rights. The third option, one that Noam Chomsky claims has been carried 
out since the 1980s, is to slowly continue building settlements and occupy 
desirable land and infrastructure until the issue of land has been resolved through 
complete occupation of desired territories. This, I claim is the underlying goal of 
the MAS in relation to the TCOs. Simply allow government-supported 
extractivism to continue to take land and resources until the question of land 
ownership will be answered through de facto extractivism. Under this model, 
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indigenous peoples would continue to exist - but only in regions deemed 
undesirable. Or allowed to waste away or enter the rural flows into the urban 
slums. This war of attrition against the lowland indigenous organic leadership 
and their NGO allies - is the MAS’ clear agenda.  
Just as Frantz Fanon described in The Wretched of the Earth, the peasants 
(in Bolivia’s case the lowland indigenous rural and forest dependent peoples) are 
in the best position to evaluate their material conditions because they are the least 
affected by colonial hegemony - so rooted are they to the land. As such, these 
peoples are the vanguard of a decolonial struggle for emancipation through 
various forms of insurrection - whether violent or nonviolent depending on 
conditions. We can observe the strongest support for territorial autonomy within 
the lowlands because of this recognition, within the lived experiences of the 
indigenous communities, that life has remained hard and, in some ways, become 
worse through economic inflation and environmental degradation.  
Irrespective of the relative merits of the theoretical debates, NGO-
indigenous coalitions remain, on the whole, important actors in the efforts for 
land and resource protection. It is true that NGOs became strong and began 
occupying the role of state apparatus under neoliberal regimes, and thus represent 
a general phase-out of democratic social programs to outside funding sources - 
with their non-local priorities. Yet, the accelerated resource extraction - both 
actively promoted and tacitly allowed - under Morales cannot be overlooked as 
the symptom of a larger problem of democracy and maldistribution. The 
relationship between environmental organizations, academic institutions, and 
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other non-state actors constitute deep concerns for democratic management of 
protected lands and access for indigenous place-based peoples. In some cases, 
fortress style conservation practices have resulted in indigenous peoples losing 
lands and management rights to traditional territories - in exchange for 
paternalistic protection and development under principles that commodify land 
and resources particular to western sensibilities.  
 As the era of U.S. hegemony comes to a close, threats to indigenous 
territories are likely to shift in new ways. Particularly with the role of non-U.S. 
development interests seeking to work with Latin American governments eager 
for a portion of resource rents. The MAS strategy to overcome underdevelopment 
via accelerated extractivism has generated genuine contradictions for the 
ecosocialist project and within indigenous communities. These contradictions 
cannot be written off as short-term opportunism or the Machiavellian 
orchestration of nation-wrecking by foreign financed NGOs. 
A study of the hegemonic power of U.S. imperialism cannot be 
discounted in our analysis of Bolivian politics. Specifically, the debt-trap that 
allowed core nations like the U.S. to siphon off surplus resources from the 
periphery (Foster and McChesney 2004). In discussing imperialism, the authors 
ask; “is the (Vietnam) war part of a more general and consistent scheme of 
United States external policies … or is it an aberration of a particular group of 
men in power? (2004:162). In a general sense, this is a question of structure 
versus agency - whether the war is a result of the internal nature of the system to 
require raw materials and labor, or the result of a ‘few bad apples?’ A similar 
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question could be posed in wrestling with the contradictions of the Morales 
Administration. We could therefore ask; are the contradictory values of 
extractivism and ecosocialism within the MAS party a result of world system 
pressures or a result of a particular group of people in power?  
In this chapter I argued that it is neither one nor the other but rather a 
synthesis of structural conditions of the world system that pressures 
revolutionaries to conform and condemns rebels to death or obscurity. When 
extraction and development take place, this should be done with the transparent 
consent of the demos, guided by principles that equitably distribute based on the 
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